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PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND
DEMOCRACY
Trevor Farrow*

I. INTRODUCTION
A. HEADING 2
This article is about the privatization of the civil dispute resolution
system, and in particular, the resulting ramifications for democracy.
Privatization is occurring at all levels of the public justice system. First, in
the civil justice system, there is an increasingly overwhelming tendency to
resolve disputes through mechanisms other than the traditional public
court process. For example, mandatory court-based mediation rules,
judicial dispute resolution initiatives, case management regimes, pre-trial
conferences, and cost-based settlement incentives have all become central
pillars of modern civil justice system tools and reforms that – either
directly or indirectly – encourage the resolution of disputes through
methods that are outside of the formal, public trial process.
Second, alongside civil court initiatives, privatization is occurring
in the administrative system as well. Tribunals and other administrative
processes are increasingly experimenting with formal and informal
alternatives to their traditional hearing-based processes. Third, nonadministrative legislative regimes – typically including arbitration statutes
– also continue to sanction (and encourage) the resolution of civil disputes
outside the formal court system. Fourth, privatization is also occurring in
*

Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I am very grateful to the Canadian
Institute for the Administration of Justice (CIAJ) for awarding me the 2007 Charles D.
Gonthier Research Fellowship, which made the research for this article possible. I am
also grateful to the CIAJ for providing me with the opportunity to present this article as
the closing paper at the 2007 CIAJ annual meeting in Halifax, Nova Scotia on 12 October
2007. Patricia Hania, Ada Ho and Alan Melamud provided excellent research assistance
for various aspects of this article, for which I am also extremely grateful.

2

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 04 NO. 04

parts of the criminal justice system. Although the state is essentially
always part of the criminal process, plea-bargaining, community-based
diversion programs and restorative justice initiatives have been – and are
increasingly becoming – significant alternatives (or complements) to the
more formal, public trial-based criminal dispute resolution system.
Finally, all of these state-based privatized (or privatizing) systems – civil,
administrative, legislative and criminal – are in addition to the already
robust, millennia-old tradition of resolving most disputes through
mechanisms entirely separate from formal state processes (private
negotiations, religious and community-based dispute resolution tools,
etc.).
There are many sound and well-documented reasons for these
privatizing trends, including reduced costs, increased speed and efficiency,
privacy, enhanced autonomy through increased party choice within and
control over dispute resolution processes, etc. However, there are also a
number of costs to these trends relating to, or involving negative impacts
on the development of the common law, potential procedural unfairness
and power imbalances between disputants. These costs are all reasons
enough – in themselves – to be concerned about these wide-ranging
trends. However, my main concern – and the driving concern behind this
article – is the potential negative impact that the privatization of public
dispute resolution processes has on systems of democratic governance.
Civil society is publicly regulated largely through legislation and
adjudication. The adjudicative function – particularly in the context of the
post-WW II welfare state – is clearly a central pillar of our processes of
government. To the extent that we are actively privatizing how we do
adjudication, we are in effect actively privatizing a large part of the way
we govern ourselves in modern democracies. Unlike the benefits of
privatization, about which people have been actively talking for some
time, there is comparatively very little discussion or debate about the costs
of privatizing our civil justice system. As one commentator has recently
noted, although the move to privatize the justice system and its results are
being “recently discovered,” they are certainly “still not understood.”1
1

Tracy Walters McCormack, “Privatizing the Justice System” (2006) 25 Rev. of Lit. 735
at pt. i [“Privatizing the Justice System”].
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This lack of understanding is of particular concern given the ongoing and
significant institutional reforms that are occurring in our justice system
and the fundamental public interest values that are stake.
In seeking to address this concern, this article focuses on three
parts of the justice system: the civil justice system, the administrative law
system, and non-administrative-based legislative initiatives – typically
including arbitration statutes – that actively sanction the resolution of civil
disputes outside of the public court and administrative law systems.2 It
does not focus on privatizing initiatives in the criminal justice system.3
By focusing on these three elements of the justice system, this
article in turn has three main goals. First, it seeks to bear witness to the
modern and wide-ranging privatization initiatives that are currently
defining the way we think about and resolve almost all civil disputes.
Second, it seeks to articulate the benefits and costs of these initiatives,
particularly including their negative impact on the way we publicly
regulate ourselves in modern, democratic societies. Third, this article
makes recommendations for future thinking about, and approaches to
these initiatives. In so doing, it calls on jurists, civil justice system
reformers, elected representatives and citizens to engage in a robust debate
about all aspects of the privatization of civil justice, the future of which
will have a fundamental impact on our public processes of democracy.

2

This article also touches on the entirely private system – including negotiation and
mediation, etc. – to the extent that the private system is annexed directly through the
public stream (either through the court system, the administrative system, or through
legislative initiatives).
3

For commentary on alternative, privatizing criminal justice initiatives, specifically
including plea-bargaining initiatives, see e.g. Joseph Di Luca, “Expedient McJustice or
Principled Alternative Dispute Resolution? A Review of Plea Bargaining in Canada”
(2005) 50 Crim. L.Q. 14. I am grateful to James Stribopoulos and Mary M. Birdsell for
assistance on this criminal law point. For a general critique of restorative justice, see e.g.
Annalise A. Acorn, Compulsory Compassion: A Critique of Restorative Justice
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004).
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II. BACKGROUND: THE “DEALERSHIP” CASE
Before looking at what I mean by privatization and some of its
representative processes, benefits and costs, I first set out the story of a
case – the “Dealership” case – that has dramatically influenced my
thinking and driven my concerns in this area of my civil justice research.
The case is also useful for animating some of the issues and arguments
that I make throughout this article. Because, in my previous career as a
litigator, I was co-counsel on the case, I have an inside perspective on it. I
also, for the same reason, am limited in what I can say both because of
basic solicitor-client confidentiality obligations and also because of a strict
confidentiality agreement. However, although I have changed and omitted
some names and facts to comply with all of my professional, ethical and
legal obligations, the case that I present below is a case that actually
happened. And I know, based on my own previous litigation practice and
my current research, that it certainly is not a unique case.
For almost 50 years John, who immigrated to the United States
when he was very young, operated a dealership in the Midwestern United
States. He sold merchandise made exclusively by one of the biggest and
most familiar manufacturers in United States history (the “Manufacturer”).
John was an extremely popular dealer who won sales awards in almost all
categories. He was a true American success story. Late in his career John
was asked – purportedly by the Manufacturer’s computer services
division’s local representative (who John had known and dealt with for
years) and as part of the overall obligations and expectations set out in his
dealership agreement – to purchase a new computer system and computer
services package. Doing (as he always did) what the computer
representative suggested and what he understood to be what the
Manufacturer required, John agreed to purchase – without doing any
research or “comparison shopping” – the full computer system and a longterm service package (the “Contract”).
As it turned out, the computer representative did not work for the
Manufacturer but rather for a newly-reorganized, separate and privatelyheld multinational corporation (the “Corporation”). Notwithstanding the
change in corporate structure and ownership, however, the representative’s
uniform, business card and letterhead continued – as they always had – to
use the Manufacturer’s logo. The computer system that the representative

2008] PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION & DEMOCRACY 5

recommended (and that John purchased) was designed for a much bigger
dealership (or series of dealerships) than what John operated. Further, the
cost of the equipment and services was vastly higher than the cost of the
same equipment and services found on the open market. Finally, there
was no Manufacturer requirement under John’s dealership agreement to
purchase the equipment or services. Put simply, the Corporation, relying
on John’s good faith, history of service, relationship with the
representative and virtually blind loyalty to the Manufacturer, sold John an
incredibly overpriced computer system and unreasonably lengthy service
package that he did not need (or in fact want).
Subsequently, when John discovered the truth about the
Corporation, the computer equipment and the service package, he decided
to stop further payments and seek to resolve the matter with the
Manufacturer and the Corporation. Because of the separate ownership
structure of the Corporation, the Manufacturer wanted nothing to do with
the dispute. The Corporation, for its part, was not willing to make any
concessions. Further, based on the clear wording of the Contract and on
John’s refusal to pay, the Corporation proceeded to take legal action.
Because the Contract provided that “all disputes” arising under the
Contract were to be resolved pursuant to the commercial arbitration rules
of a major American arbitration association, the Corporation initiated
arbitration proceedings against John.
The Corporation’s claim was simple: John should make the
payments owed under the Contract. John, in his defense and counterclaim, argued that, in a nutshell, because the costs of the system and
services were not only unreasonably high but were based on what
amounted to at least a contract of adhesion if not fraud, the Contract
should be set aside and he should be compensated for his losses (the
payments that he had made to that date under the Contract).4 After a
week-long hearing, the arbitrator found for the Corporation and dismissed
John’s counter-claim. Notwithstanding several years of preparation,
volumes of documentary discovery and weeks of depositions, the
4

An animating (and aggravating) factor for John’s defence and counter-claim was the
fact that, given the system’s incompatibility for a smaller dealership the size of John’s, it
did not function as advertised (or really at all).
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arbitrator – consistent with the arbitration association’s practice, rules and
guidelines – provided no oral or written reasons at all for his judgment.
And because of the terms of the Contract, John essentially had no right of
appeal.
Reasonable people can always disagree – particularly in hindsight
– as to what the correct result should have been in a given case. While I
am convinced that the arbitrator in the Dealership case got it wrong, I do
not think that he acted in bad faith. However, as I discuss later in this
article,5 I am strongly of the view that the business practices of the
Corporation that led to the dispute were at least unfairly aggressive, were
likely pursued – at least by some – in bad faith, were part of a systematic
and nation-wide approach of the Corporation to target similarly situated
dealers through deceptive business practices and, as a result, likely
amounted to fraud. Further, in addition to the questionable conduct on the
part of the Corporation, I know – as I also discuss later in this article6 –
that the lawyers for the Corporation acted on numerous occasions
unprofessionally and in bad faith.
Unfortunately, the private dispute resolution system in which we
were working – state-sanctioned commercial arbitration – did not provide
the tools by which such conduct on the part of either the Corporation or its
lawyers could be properly discovered, made public, prohibited or
sanctioned. Part of the reason, as is discussed further below,7 was the
system’s lack of meaningful procedural safeguards. The more significant
reason, in my view, was the curtain of secrecy – provided for by
strategically drafted wide-ranging confidentiality provisions – that
shielded the systematically suspect conduct of the Corporation and its
lawyers in our proceeding, and in all of the similar proceedings about
which we knew but could do nothing about. It is to these types of privacy
issues – and their related impact both on individual litigants and on the
regulation of large sectors of society – to which I now turn.
5

See infra part IX.

6

Ibid.

7

Ibid.
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III. PRIVATIZATION
What do I mean by privatization?8 Privatization, as I will further
discuss and develop throughout this article, means four (often related)
things.

A. JURISDICTIONAL PREFERENCES
First, as a matter of jurisdiction, it means a preference for moving
away from directly state-funded and state-run dispute resolution forums
(e.g. civil courts or administrative tribunals) and toward typically
privately-organized and privately-funded initiatives (e.g. private mediation
chambers or arbitration regimes, etc.). This preference has led to what the
Supreme Court of Canada has recently described as the creation of a
“private justice system.”9 It was also this form of privatization that was
specifically at issue in the Dealership case: a forum selection clause in the
Corporation’s standard form Contract that ousted the jurisdiction of a
court in favour of a private arbitration regime.10

8

The privatization of civil justice is a topic that I have been specifically thinking about
for some time and in which – given its fundamental procedural and normative
implications – I continue to be interested. For some preliminary thinking on the topic,
see e.g. Trevor C. W. Farrow, “Privatizing our Public Civil Justice System” (2006) 9
News & Views on Civil Justice Reform 16, online: Canadian Forum on Civil Justice
(CFCJ) <http://www.cfcj-fcjc.org/issue_9/CFCJ%20(eng)%20spring%202006Privatizing.pdf> [“Privatizing our Public Civil Justice System”], Trevor C. W. Farrow,
“Re-Framing the Sharia Arbitration Debate” (2006) 15:2 Const. Forum Const. 79 [“ReFraming the Sharia Arbitration Debate”], Trevor C. W. Farrow, “The rule of law in
developing countries is not just about courts” 26:31 The Lawyers Weekly (15 December
2006) (QL) [“The rule of law in developing countries is not just about courts”]. For some
earlier comments, see Trevor C. W. Farrow, “Dispute Resolution, Access to Civil Justice
and Legal Education” (2005) 42 Alta. L. Rev. 741 at 797-798 [“Dispute Resolution,
Access to Civil Justice and Legal Education”]. See further Andrew Pirie, “Critiques of
Settlement Advocacy” [“Critiques of Settlement Advocacy”] in Colleen M. Hanycz,
Trevor C. W. Farrow and Frederick H. Zemans, The Theory and Practice of
Representative Negotiation (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2008) at c. 11.
9

Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, 2007 SCC 34, at para. 132
(reference omitted).

10

Supra part II.
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Further, even within the public court system, there is a continued
and increasing preference – expressly promoted by all stakeholders in the
public civil dispute resolution system, including governments, courts and
judges, lawyers, law societies, bar associations, law schools and clients –
for using private processes such as mandatory mediation regimes, judicial
dispute resolution initiatives, settlement negotiations, etc., rather than the
publicly-scrutinized full trial process.

B. PRIVACY
Second, as an information flow matter, privatization means moving
disputes out of the public eye and into confidential, or at least largely
private, settings. This aspect of privatization is part of the confidential
processes in the public justice and administrative law systems (e.g.
mandatory or voluntary mediation programs that increasingly form parts
of both of those public systems). It is also a defining badge of private
processes (e.g. commercial arbitration). Again, this aspect of privatization
was at issue in the Dealership case: it was clearly the motivation of the
Corporation to keep its affairs out of the eyes of the public.11

C. LAWYERS: PROFESSIONALISM AND COMMERCIALISM
Third, the active involvement of lawyers in the settlement process
through various ADR regimes including court-annexed judicial dispute
resolution processes and private settlement negotiations has become an
important and relatively newly-recognized aspect of lawyers’ professional
responsibility obligations. Further, as a commercial matter, privatization
at the same time recognizes the increased role for private, for-profit actors
in the resolution of civil disputes. The number of lawyers and other
professionals advertising an expertise in all ADR areas and processes
continues to expand in Canada.

D. CIVIL SOCIETY
Fourth, as a social relations matter, privatization downloads the
resolution of civil disputes from the public and collective levels of civil

11

Ibid.
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society to more intimate and private spheres: the family, religious
communities, the boardroom, the web, etc.12

E. OVERALL RESULT
All of these understandings of privatization animate the various
arguments that I make in this article. The overall result of these four
meanings of privatization – taken together – is a systematic increase in the
number of all kinds of disputes, including commercial manufacturing and
service disputes, employment disputes, pay-equity disputes, police
complaints, family disputes, human rights complaints, etc., that are being
decided in private, using private adjudicators, with no public access, and
without necessarily any of the procedural safeguards that are typically
provided for in our public court or tribunal systems.13 These forms of
privatization are encouraged, mandated and/or happening in all sectors and
at all levels of the civil justice system, the administrative system and
through statutorily-encouraged private dispute resolution initiatives.

IV. GOVERNMENT PREFERENCES FOR PRIVATIZATION
As a starting point, it is important to recognize that the introduction
into, and encouragement of privatization initiatives in these three levels of
the civil dispute resolution system is part of a larger – federal and
provincial – government strategy to encourage the privatization of dispute
resolution in relation essentially to all activities in which the government
is involved or regarding which it has some direct or indirect connection.
At the federal level, for example, Canada’s Dispute Resolution
Service (DRS) was established in 1992, under the watch of the
Department of Justice, actively to promote ADR and related services.
According to its materials:
…DRS…is devoted to the prevention and management of
disputes. Our mandate is to serve as a leading centre of DR
12

For a useful treatment of changes in public and private space, see Law Commission of
Canada, ed., New Perspectives on the Public-Private Divide (Vancouver: UBC Press,
2003).

13

See “Re-Framing the Sharia Arbitration Debate”, supra note 8.
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excellence in Canada. Our role is to promote a greater
understanding of DR and assist in the integration of DR
into the policies, operations and practices of departments
and agencies of the Government of Canada, Crown
Corporations, federal tribunals and administrative agencies,
and federally constituted courts.14

At the provincial level, similar initiatives have been pursued. In
British Columbia, for example, the Government – through the Ministry of
Attorney General – has developed an active policy of ADR promotion
through the 1996 creation of the Dispute Resolution Office (DRO).
According to its public materials:
The Ministry of Attorney General’s…[DRO] develops and
promotes non-adversarial dispute resolution options within
the justice system and government. Options such as
mediation encourage early settlement of disputes and are
less expensive than processes used in the formal court
system.15

The policy considerations behind these initiatives are animated by
the general reform trends and research projects carried out over the past
several decades in various Commonwealth countries – including Canada16
14

Department of Justice Canada, “DRS Programs and Services” (last updated: 24 April
2007),
online:
Government
of
Canada
<http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/drs/drs_programs.html>.

15

B.C. Ministry of Attorney General, “DRO”, online: B.C. Government
<http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/dro/>.

16

The B.C. Ministry of Attorney General specifies that the DRO initiatives “are largely
outcomes of considerable research and study carried out in the 1990’s by organizations
and professional groups across common law jurisdictions, for example, the Canadian Bar
Association’s Systems of Civil Justice Task Force Report, Lord Wolff’s Report on
Access to Justice, England, and Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice
System, a report published by the Australian Law Reform Commission.” See ibid. at
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– toward simplified and privatized ADR initiatives across all aspects of the
public civil dispute resolution spectrum. Again according to the B.C.
Ministry of Attorney General:
There is considerable interest in resolving civil disputes
outside of the formal court system. Options such as
mediation are being employed by the courts, administrative
tribunals, and ministries and agencies of the Government of
BC to provide people with viable dispute resolution
processes…
The Ministry of Attorney General has adopted an ADR
Policy, signaling its commitment to a justice and conflict
resolution environment which includes a wide range of
dispute resolution options.
In 1996, the ministry
established the…DRO…to develop and implement dispute
resolution options in the court system and in government.
Since 1996, the DRO has worked with a number of
government ministries, boards, agencies and commissions
to design and help implement [] dispute resolution
processes. It has also helped organizations consider ways
to improve existing processes to make them more efficient
and effective.17
The goals of these sorts of initiatives are clear. For example, the
Ministry of Attorney General states its intention to, among other things:
Further develop the ADR policy to broaden and encourage
the application of dispute resolution options through:
“Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy and Design”, online: B.C. Government
<http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/dro/policy-design/index.htm>. Some of these reform
initiatives are cited and discussed further in this article. See e.g. infra note 32 and
surrounding text.
17

B.C. Ministry of Attorney General, DRO, “Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy and
Design”,
online:
B.C.
Government
<http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/dro/policydesign/index.htm>.
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a) continuing consultation with dispute
resolution stakeholders and advocates;
b) promoting the use of alternative dispute
resolution options among all ministries
and agencies of government;
c) promoting the use of alternative dispute
resolution techniques in neighbourhood
or community disputes;
d) identifying and removing barriers to the
understanding and use of alternative
dispute resolution options;
e) supporting multi-party alternative
dispute resolution processes such as land
use planning, aboriginal treaty.18
Three key aspects of these sorts of federal and provincial
government dispute resolution preferences include encouraging the
privatization of civil dispute resolution in the civil justice system
(discussed immediately below), the administrative system (discussed infra
at part VI), and through provincial and federal arbitration and other
enabling dispute resolution legislative initiatives (discussed infra at part
VII).

V. CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM
The first part of the public civil dispute resolution system on which
I focus in this article is the civil justice system, with a primary focus on
the provincial superior civil courts.

A. SUPERIOR COURTS
Modern provincial superior courts of record throughout Canada
enjoy the plenary jurisdiction, power and authority at law and in equity
18

Ibid. at “Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy and Design: Policy Statement,
Objectives”
(objective
12),
online:
B.C.
Government
<http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/dro/policy-design/statement.htm>.
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that were historically exercised by the courts of common law and equity in
England and subsequently in early Canada.19 This plenary jurisdiction
provides courts with “all the powers that are necessary to do justice”
(typically within the province20), which is a jurisdiction that is “unlimited
and unrestricted in substantive law in civil matters.”21 This jurisdiction is
limited only “where provided specifically to the contrary” by a “special
law”.22
This adjudicative regime provides for a publicly funded dispute
resolution system that is – at least in theory23 – open to all parties and to
all disputes. As summarized by John Godfrey Spragge (when advocating
– before becoming a Chancellor of Upper Canada – for an early court of
equity in Upper Canada), this system, which is “built upon precedent and
19

See e.g. Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 11(2). See also Constitution
Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 (U.K.), ss. 92(13)-(14), 96-100, 129.

20

For rules regarding the commencement of proceedings within and without a province,
see e.g. Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, as amended, rr. 16-17.
For a discussion of the extraterritorial application of a provincial superior court’s
jurisdiction, see e.g. Janet Walker gen. ed. et al., The Civil Litigation Process: Cases and
Materials, 6th ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2005) [The Civil Litigation Process] at
249-271.

21

80 Wellesley St. East Ltd. v. Fundy Bay Builders Ltd. et. al., [1972] 2 O.R. 280, Brooke
J.A. (CA) (QL). See also Board v. Board (1919), 48 D.L.R. 13 (P.C.). For a brief history
of the courts in Canada, see The Civil Litigation Process, supra note 20 at 18-44.

22

80 Wellesley St. East Ltd. v. Fundy Bay Builders Ltd. et. al., supra note 21. For
contrary jurisdictional legislation, see e.g. Courts of Justice Act, supra note 19 at s. 148
(recognizing the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Canada).

23

Of course there is overwhelming evidence of the lack of access to courts that many, if
not most, Canadians experience today. And this lack of access is one of the reasons for
the development of alternative models of civil dispute resolution, as discussed further
below (infra note 126 and surrounding text). For a further discussion, see “Dispute
Resolution, Access to Civil Justice and Legal Education”, supra note 8. And there is also
evidence that the court system, although in theory open, did not always provide for just
and progressive decisions and policies for all members of society. For a discussion of
some of these issues, see W. Bogart, Courts and Country (Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1994) 107-124 [Courts and Country], cited in The Civil Litigation Process, supra
note 20 at 36-44.

14
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authority”, is established by the state “so that a man may, with reasonable
certainty, know what the law is, and govern himself accordingly”.24 To
bring into effect this regulatory influence of this system, court orders are
entered in the entry book of the provincial registrar,25 precedents are
published, and “all court hearings shall be open to the public.”26 Taken
together, this regime provides an adjudication tool that has played an
“instrumental” role in the “historical development of Canada” and in
“economic growth”27 and that continues to be “an essential component of
our democratic form of government.”28

B. PRIVATIZATION THROUGH ADR AND OTHER REFORMS
Almost since their inception, concerns over the high cost, low
efficiency and imperfect access to these public court systems have led to
continued reform efforts. In the United States, for example, according to
an 1850 proposal, reforms to the civil procedure system of New York were
“to make legal proceedings more intelligible, more certain, more speedy,
and less expensive.”29 Similar wording is found in most modern reform
efforts as well, which really hit their stride in the 1970s in the United
24

From a pamphlet by John Godfrey Spragge (untitled and undated) in The Civil
Litigation Process, supra note 20 at 20.

25

See e.g. Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 20 at r. 59.05.

26

See e.g. Courts of Justice Act, supra note 19 at s. 135(1) (subject to the limited
exceptions provided for in s. 135(2)).

27

M. H. Ogilvie, “Recent Developments in Canadian Law: Legal History” (1987) 19
Ottawa L. Rev. 225 at 237, 239 [“Recent Developments in Canadian Law: Legal
History”].

28

Wayne D. Brazil, “Hosting Mediations as a Representative of the System of Civil
Justice” (2007) 22 Ohio St. J. Disp. Resol. 227 at 241. For comments that these
progressive values were more present in American than in Canadian courts in the 1800s
and early 1900s, see “Recent Developments in Canadian Law: Legal History”, supra note
27 at 250-251. See also Courts and Country, supra note 23. Regardless, the influence of
the courts on the development of economic and social relations in Canada, particularly
over the past 25 years, is undeniable.

29

Arphaxed Loomis, David Graham and David Dudley Field, “Commission of Practice
& Pleadings Code Civ. Proc.: Report” (N.Y., iii, 1850) (HeinOnline).
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States in the context of widespread dissatisfaction with the overall
administration of civil justice. Those reform initiatives – including for
example the 1976 Pound Conference and discussions by Frank Sander and
his colleagues at Harvard Law School30 about a multi-door courthouse –
continue to drive modern thinking about ways of making the delivery of
civil justice more accessible and efficient.31
Reform initiatives across Canada have followed their American
counterparts. In 1996, at the national level, the Canadian Bar Association
engaged in a wide-ranging and influential review of the delivery of civil
justice in Canada. Numerous observations and recommendations, made in
that report, have led to significant and ongoing reform initiatives in this
country.32

30

For comment on the influence of these individuals on modern dispute resolution
reforms, see e.g. Jay Folberg, “A Mediation Overview: History and Dimensions of
Practice” in (1983) 1 Mediation Q., c. 1, p. 3 at 7. For some of their ideas, see e.g. Frank
E. A. Sander, “Varieties of Dispute Processing” in A. Leo Levin and Russell R. Wheeler,
eds., The Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the Future (St. Paul: West
Publishing, 1979) 65.

31

For brief discussions of ADR’s modern history, see e.g. “Dispute Resolution, Access to
Civil Justice and Legal Education”, supra note 8 at pt. II.A-C, Trevor C. W. Farrow,
“Thinking About Dispute Resolution”, Review Essay (2003) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 559 at pt. I.
See further e.g. Warren E. Burger, “Isn’t There a Better Way?” (1982) 68 A.B.A. J. 274,
Brian Dickson, “ADR, The Courts and The Judicial System: The Canadian Context”
(1994) 28 L. Soc’y Gaz. 231 at 236, George W. Adams, Mediating Justice: Legal Dispute
Negotiations (Toronto: CCH Canadian, 2003) at 12-15, D. Paul Emond, “Alternative
Dispute Resolution: A Conceptual Overview” in D. Paul Emond, ed., Commercial
Dispute Resolution: Alternatives to Litigation (Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, 1989) 1
[“A Conceptual Overview”], “Critiques of Settlement Advocacy”, supra note 8 at 290292, Andrew Pirie, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Skills, Science, and the Law (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2000) at 1-33, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “Introduction: What Will We Do
When Adjudication Ends? A Brief Intellectual History of ADR” (1997) 44 UCLA L.
Rev. 1613.
32

See Canadian Bar Association (CBA), Task Force on Systems of Civil Justice,
“Systems of Civil Justice Task Force Report” (Ottawa: CBA, 1996), online: CBA
<http://www.cba.org/CBA/pubs/pdf/systemscivil_tfreport.pdf> [“CBA Task Force
Report”]. The CFCJ and others held two “Into the Future” conferences recently to
discuss the “agenda for civil justice reform” coming out of the “CBA Task Force
Report”. For useful papers and discussions from those conferences, see CFCJ, “Into the
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However, notwithstanding these significant initiatives, the same
calls for reforms to address cost, speed and backlogs continue to be made.
For example, in December 2006, former Ontario Chief Justice R. Roy
McMurtry made the following comments:
In Ontario, it has been recognized for some years that our
civil justice system is in a crisis…
I became a judge in 1991 and very quickly learned that the
issue of access to civil justice would be the principal justice
challenge for the foreseeable future. In 1995, as the Chief
Justice of the Superior Court, I referred to the crisis and
stated publicly that:
As well as the increasing cost, the system is
labouring under the tremendous weight of a
growing backlog of cases and a serious lack
of adequate resources. Litigants must wait
an inordinate length of time to resolve their
civil disputes. Significant initiatives are
absolutely essential if our court is to be able
to provide timely and affordable justice to
the citizens of this province.

Future – Conference Papers”, online CFCJ <http://cfcj-fcjc.org/publications/itfen.php#1>. For a further discussion of the CBA initiatives, see “Dispute Resolution,
Access to Civil Justice and Legal Education”, supra note 8 at pt. II.C. For useful sources
for civil justice reform initiatives, see Margaret A. Shone, “Civil Justice Reform in
Canada: 1996 to 2006 and Beyond” (December 2006), online: CFCJ <http://cfcjfcjc.org/docs/2006/shone-final-en.pdf> [“Civil Justice Reform in Canada: 1996 to 2006
and Beyond”], CFCJ, “Inventory of Reforms”, online CFCJ <http://cfcjfcjc.org/news/?cat=2> (which includes reform initiatives in Canada from 1950-2007).
For discussions of, and links to many of the civil justice reform initiatives discussed
below, see CFCJ, “Civil Justice News”, online: CFCJ <http://cfcj-fcjc.org/news/?cat=2>
[“Civil Justice News”]. This portion of this article is significantly influenced by those
sources, discussions and links.

2008] PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION & DEMOCRACY 17

Well, almost twelve years later, the crisis has deepened
despite the best efforts of a lot of people, judges, lawyers
and officials in the Ministry of the Attorney General.33
At the provincial and territorial levels, numerous efforts are being
made to address the kinds of “crisis” that the former Chief Justice of
Ontario described. Every superior court in Canada has been looking at
ways of making civil dispute resolution processes more efficient and
effective.34 For example, the B.C. Justice Review Task Force recently
released its “Effective and Affordable Civil Justice” report35 and proposed
new rules of civil procedure.36 In Alberta, the Rules Project of the Alberta
Law Reform Institute (ALRI) also recently released its proposed new rules
of civil procedure.37 Ontario38 and Nova Scotia39 are both currently
33

The Honourable R. Roy McMurtry, CFCJ, Civil Justice Reform Conference: Phase II,
Remarks
(7
December
2006)
at
3-4,
online:
CFCJ
<http://cfcjfcjc.org/docs/2006/mcmurtry-en.pdf> [“McMurtry Remarks”].

34

For a very useful and comprehensive study of, and recommendations regarding, civil
justice reform initiatives across Canada, see “Civil Justice Reform in Canada: 1996 to
2006 and Beyond”, supra note 32. Of course, similar initiatives are being experimented
with in courts not only in Canada but also in most countries around the world. For the
present purpose, however, this part of this article will primarily limit itself to reform
initiatives in Canadian courts.

35

Civil Justice Reform Working Group to the Justice Review Task Force, “Effective and
Affordable Civil Justice” (November 2006), online: B.C. Justice Review Task Force
<http://www.bcjusticereview.org/working_groups/civil_justice/cjrwg_report_11_06.pdf>
.

36

B.C. Justice Review Task Force, “Proposed New Rules of Civil Procedure of the
British Columbia Supreme Court” (23 July 2007), online: B.C. Justice Review Task
Force, <http://www.bcjusticereviewforum.ca/civilrules/downloads/conceptDraft.pdf>.
For earlier B.C. reform initiatives, see e.g. Hon. E. N. Hughes, Access to Justice: Report
of the Justice Reform Committee (Victoria: Ministry of Attorney General, 1988).

37

ALRI, “Alberta Rules of Court”, Test Draft 3 (February 2007), online: University of
Alberta,
Faculty
of
Law
<http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/docs/ALRIdraft%20Rules%20of%20Court%20TD3.pdf
>.

38

See Hon. Coulter A. Osborne, Q.C., “Civil Justice Reform Project” (November 2007),
online: Ontario Government
<http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/cjrp/>. For earlier Ontario
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pursuing significant civil justice reform projects. Québec, several years
ago, enacted significant changes to its Code of Civil Procedure.40 And
other jurisdictions are similarly engaged in significant reform initiatives.41
Because the main concerns that underlie these reform efforts often
include – as the former Chief Justice of Ontario identified – speed and
cost, many of the potential solutions involve ADR and ADR-related
initiatives. As McMurtry J. stated, in these types of reform initiatives, “we
recognize that ADR is now firmly entrenched.”42 It is these kinds of ADR
reforms that form essential elements of the privatization trends that I am
discussing in this article. For example, court-annexed mediation,43 judgereform initiatives, see e.g. Zuber Commission Report: Ontario, “Report of Ontario Courts
Inquiry”, by T. G. Zuber (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Attorney General, 1987), Law
Society of Upper Canada (LSUC), “Alternatives – The Report of the Dispute Resolution
Subcommittee” (Toronto: LSUC, 1993), Ontario Civil Justice Review, “Civil Justice
Review: Supplemental and Final Report” (Toronto: Ontario Civil Justice Review, 1996).
39

See e.g. The Court of Nova Scotia, Civil Procedure Rules Nova Scotia: Rules Revision
Project,
online:
The
Court
of
Nova
Scotia
<http://www.courts.ns.ca/rules_revision/revision.htm>.

40

R.S.Q., c. C-25 (updated to 1 September 2007), online: Éditeur official du Québec
<http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=2&
file=/C_25/C25_A.HTM>. For commentary on Québec’s civil justice reform process,
see Justice Québec, “Reform of Civil Procedure”, online: Justice Québec
<http://www.justice.gouv.qc.ca/english/ministere/dossiers/crpc/crpc-a.htm>.

41

See e.g. Yukon Government, News Release, “Government Modernizing Yukon Courts
By Amending Three Acts” (31 October 2005), online: Yukon Government
<http://www.gov.yk.ca/news/2005/05-284.html>. See earlier Manitoba, Civil Justice
Review Task Force, “Manitoba Civil Justice Review Task Force Report” (Winnipeg:
Department of Justice, 1996) (Chair: David Newman). Many of these reform initiatives
discussed in this note and notes 34-40 and surrounding text are also discussed briefly in
“Dispute Resolution, Access to Civil Justice and Legal Education”, supra note 8 at n. 46
and surrounding text. See also CFCJ, “Civil Justice News”, supra note 32.
42

43

“McMurtry Remarks”, supra note 33 at 7.

See e.g. Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, Civil Practice Note No. 11, “Court
Annexed Mediation” (effective 1 September 2004), online: Alberta Courts
<http://www.albertacourts.ab.ca/qb/practicenotes/civil/pn11CourtAnnexedMediation.pdf
>, Saskatchewan, Queen’s Bench Act, 1998, S.S. 1998, c. Q-1.01, s. 42 (“Mediation”),
Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 25 at r. 24.1 (“Mandatory Mediation”).
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assisted44 and judicial dispute resolution programs,45 specific familyrelated mediation services in superior courts,46 notices to mediate,47 etc.,
all directly provide for non-trial-based, typically private alternative
processes for the resolution of court-based civil disputes.
The motivation behind these court-connected ADR initiatives is
clear: “to reduce cost and delay in litigation and facilitate the early and fair
resolution of disputes.”48 Further, case management49 and pre-trial
conference50 initiatives provide judges with other robust tools for the
encouragement and facilitation of private settlements out of court (or at
least out of the scrutiny of the public court room).51 Additionally,

44

See e.g. Québec’s judge-assisted “Settlement Conference” initiative: Justice Québec,
“Settlement Conference of the Superior Court of Québec”, online:
<http://www.justice.gouv.qc.ca/english/publications/generale/amiable-cs-a.htm>.

45

For a discussion of the Judicial Dispute Resolution program in Alberta’s Court of
Queen’s Bench, see the Honourable Justice John A. Agrios, “A Handbook on Judicial
Dispute Resolution for Canadian Lawyers”, Version 1.1 (January 2004), online: CBA –
Alberta <http://www.cba.org/alberta/PDF/JDR%20Handbook.pdf>.

46

See e.g. Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, “Family Mediation Services”,
online:
Ontario
Government
<http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/family/mediation.asp>.

47

See e.g. British Columbia Dispute Resolution Office, “Bulletin: Notice to Mediate,
(General) Regulation” (June 2002), online: British Columbia Government
<http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/dro/publications/bulletins/general.htm>.

48

Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 25 at r. 24.1.01. For judicial commentary
on the purpose of R. 24.1, see e.g. Hagel v. Giles (2006), 80 O.R. (3d) 170 at paras. 27,
34 (S.C.J.), aff’d (2006), 82 O.R. (3d) 470. See also Dicaro v. Wong, [2001] O.J. No.
347 (Master). As is clear from the case law, courts are slow to exempt parties from these
mandatory ADR requirements. See e.g. O. (G.) v. H. (C.D.) (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 82
(S.C.J.), discussed further infra at notes 165-166 and surrounding text.
49

See e.g. Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 25 at rr. 77-78.

50

See e.g. ibid. at r. 50.

51

See e.g. ibid. at rr. 77.13(5)-(6), both of which sub-rules provide for the referral of “any
issue for alternative dispute resolution”.
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incentives built into typical Canadian fee-shifting cost rules provide
parties with added legislatively-sanctioned court-based encouragement for
private, non-trial-based settlements.52 Taken together, these are the sorts
of civil justice tools that make up “all of the efforts over many years to
encourage settlement between parties.”53

C. OTHER COURTS
Courts of statutory jurisdiction in Canada are also experimenting
with significant reform initiatives, many of which – seeking the same
reform goals of reduced cost and increased speed and efficiency – result in
the privatization of their processes. Small claims courts, for example,
which have played an important role in the state’s goal of providing a just,
cost-effective and accessible public venue for the resolution of many dayto-day disputes in society,54 have for some years been experimenting with
and implementing various alternative private process options. Many of
these initiatives include various case management and other ADR

52

See e.g. ibid. at r. 49.

53

Hagel v. Giles, supra note 48 at para. 34, D. J. Power J.

54

Small claims courts, according to Marvin Zuker, “originated in response to a
perception that the complex and technical regular civil procedure made it virtually
impossible for wage earners and small businessmen to use the court system to collect
wages or accounts which they were owed.” Marvin A. Zuker, Small Claims Court
Practice (Toronto: Carswell, 1998) 2-3 [Small Claims Court Practice], in The Civil
Litigation Process, supra note 20 at 27. Key to the process is an effort to reduce delay by
simplifying the process by which these disputes get resolved. Badges of the small claims
court system include less of a need for litigants to be represented by lawyers, more
interventionist judges (able to assist the parties when necessary to narrow the issues and
move through the trial process), relaxed rules of evidence and simplified rules of trial
procedure. See e.g. Small Claims Court Rules, O. Reg. 258/98, as amended. See also
Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, “Small Claims Court Guides to Procedures”,
online:
Ontario
Government
<http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/courts/guides/>. In sum, according to
Zuker, the “crux of the small claims procedure is informality and simplicity”. Small
Claims Court Practice, supra. Informality, however, does not equal privacy. The
traditional small claims court model still contemplates an open, public dispute resolution
process.
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(typically mediation-oriented) regimes.55 Other provincial inferior court
initiatives include mediation and case management programs, often in
family law cases.56 Similarly, at the federal court level, case management
and ADR – primarily through the court’s “case management and dispute
resolution services” program57 – have been implemented for some years
now and are being actively pursued as tools to reduce backlog and
eliminate “dead wood” proceedings from the court’s docket.58

D. JUDGES, LAW SOCIETIES, BAR ASSOCIATIONS AND LAW
SCHOOLS
In addition to government preferences59 that have led to these
various court-based reform initiatives, there are numerous other players in
the civil justice system that are also actively participating in and
promoting the use of alternative – private – processes for resolving civil
disputes.
One of the most influential voices in this group of civil justice
participants is that of judges. Increasingly the courts are actively speaking
up and encouraging parties to make use of out-of-court settlement
processes, including mediation, negotiation (either directly or through
lawyers), other ADR settlement processes and cost-based settlement

55

See e.g. Alberta Provincial Court: “Mediation and the Provincial Court”, online:
Alberta Courts
<http://www.albertacourts.ab.ca/pc/civil/publication/mediation_and_the_provincial_court
.htm>, British Columbia Dispute Resolution Office, “Bulletin: Court Mediation Program”
(June 2002), online: <http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/dro/publications/bulletins/courtmediation.htm>. See generally “Civil Justice Reform in Canada: 1996 to 2006 and
Beyond”, supra note 32 at 31-32, The Civil Litigation Process, supra note 20 at 26-30.

56

See e.g. Ontario Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 439/07, s. 40.

57

See Federal Court Rules, SOR/2004-283, pt. 9, rr. 380-391.

58

The Honourable Allan Lutfy, Swearing-in Ceremony, Associate Chief Justice (as he
then was) (7 January 2000), online: Federal Court of Canada <http://cas-ncr-nter03.cassatj.gc.ca/portal/page/portal/fc_cf_en/Speech>.

59

Discussed supra part IV.
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incentives.60 For example, when speaking generally about resolving
disputes out of court, Armstrong J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal
stated that: “Settlement discussion is something which pervades, and
should pervade, almost every lawsuit.”61 Similarly, Gonthier J. – when
speaking about the modern, expansive role of the advocate – stated that:

60

Settlement through private means has become the norm, and not the exception, in the
civil justice system. Put simply: almost all disputes settle. According to one source, the
“vast majority [of cases]…are…resolved through a variety of related processes that have
come to be grouped under the broad heading of ‘alternative dispute resolution…’” The
Civil Litigation Process, supra note 20 at 525. Further, as Paul Emond has noted, “the
vast majority (95% to 98%) of disputes are resolved through negotiation and not
adjudication”. See “A Conceptual Overview”, supra note 31 at 3. For further
discussions of these trends, see e.g. Julie Macfarlane, “Why Do People Settle?” (2001) 46
McGill L.J. 663 at 665, ALRI, Consultation Memorandum No. 12.6, “Promoting Early
Resolution of Disputes by Settlement” (Edmonton: ALRI, July 2003), online: ALRI
Homepage <http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/docs/cm12-6.pdf> at 8, n. 17, which
indicates that the “current ratio of trials to filings in…Canadian and foreign jurisdictions”
is “less tha[n] 2%.” For a further discussion of these comments, see “Dispute Resolution,
Access to Civil Justice and Legal Education”, supra note 8 at n. 43. Similarly, according
to the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), “As the empirical data…confirms,
the vast majority of civil disputes commenced within the federal court and tribunal
system are concluded by means other than formal adjudication…They are settled by
negotiation or through other dispute resolution mechanisms (such as mediation,
conciliation or arbitration)…” ALRC, “Review of the Federal Civil Justice System”,
Discussion Paper 62 (1999) at c. 3, para. 3.40 [footnotes omitted], online: ALRC
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/dp/62/>, discussed further in
“Dispute Resolution, Access to Civil Justice and Legal Education”, supra note 8 at n. 44
and surrounding text. Estimates as to the way and at what stage of the process these
disputes are resolved vary and are not precise. However, at least one Ontario report
found that “approximately 55% of cases commenced never proceed to the point where a
statement of defence is filed” and the “remaining 45% of the case load proceeds through
various additional stages of litigation, with the vast majority settling at some point
between the pleading stage and the eve or morning of trial.” Ontario Civil Justice
Review, First Report (March 1995), online: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General
<http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/cjr/> at c. 13, n. 47 and
surrounding text, also in The Civil Litigation Process, supra note 20 at 529 (footnote
omitted).
61

Ristimaki v. Cooper (2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 648 at para. 76 (C.A.) (QL). For other
judicial comments regarding settlement encouragement, see e.g. Heritage Duty Free Shop
Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] B.C.J. No. 1208 at paras. 17-18 (S.C.) (QL),
aff’d [2005] B.C.J. No. 670 (C.A.), Guelph Centre Partners Inc. v. Guelph Storm Ltd.,
[2005] O.J. No. 458 at para. 10 (S.C.J.) (QL). See also the discussion of settlement in
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[C]ontrary to popular belief, not only will a good advocate
not foment dissension and promote disputes between
parties, he will seek to reconcile opposing interests in order
to avoid the ultimate confrontation of a trial. He will be
called on to play the role of moderator, negotiator and
conciliator. Indeed, it is his duty to facilitate a rapid
solution to disputes and to avoid fruitless or frivolous
actions…Thus, whenever it is appropriate to do so, the
advocate must discuss alternative dispute resolution
methods (mediation, conciliation and arbitration) with his
client, and must properly advise the client regarding the
benefits of settling disputes. He may also hold discussions
with the opposing party and negotiate a resolution of the
dispute between the parties.62
Taking the spirit of these statements seriously, lawyers are
increasingly espousing the merits of ADR with their clients. This opening
up to settlement alternatives is occurring at one level as a practical –
business-savvy – matter. Lawyers are realizing the increased benefits for
their clients in using ADR tools in terms of cost and time savings. They
are also increasingly discovering their own economic opportunities and
benefits that can result from expanding their practice skills to include
ADR tools.
At another – professional – level, lawyers’ warming up to
alternative, private settlement tools is also occurring as a matter of
professional conduct. For example, according to the Legal Ethics
Handbook of the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society,
A lawyer has a duty to advise and encourage the client to
settle a case rather than commence or continue legal

Trevor C. W. Farrow, “Ethics in Advocacy” in Alice Woolley, Brent Cotter and John
Law, eds., Professional Responsibility in Canada (Toronto: LexisNexis, forthcoming).
See further Rogacki v. Belz (2003), 67 O.R. (3d) 330 (C.A.), Rudd v. Trossacs
Investments Inc. (2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 687 (Div. Ct.).
62

Fortin v. Chrétien, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 500 at para. 53.
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proceedings where the case can be settled fairly and
reasonably.
The lawyer should consider the appropriateness of alternate
dispute resolution (ADR) to the resolution of issues in
every case and, if appropriate, the lawyer should inform the
client of ADR options and, if so instructed, take steps to
pursue those options.63
Similarly, bar associations are also actively encouraging the use of
privatizing tools in the civil justice process through best practices
statements64 and model codes of conduct.65 These moves have been
clearly mandated for some time and have developed out of significant
reform initiatives such as the “CBA Task Force Report”, which described
the “adoption of a dispute resolution approach” to “litigation practice” as a
“new professional obligation.”66
Finally, law schools – following their United States counterparts as
well as the recommendations in the “CBA Task Force Report”
contemplating a “revolutionizing” of legal education toward the increased
63

Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society (NSBS), Legal Ethics Handbook, rr. 10.2-10.2A,
online: NSBS <http://www.nsbs.org/legalethics/chapter10.htm> (footnote omitted).

64

See e.g. CBA–British Columbia Branch, “Our Court System and Solving Disputes”,
online:
CBA–British
Columbia
Branch
<http://www.cba.org/BC/public_media/lawyers/432.aspx>.

65

For example, in a similar spirit to the settlement and ADR provisions of the NSBS’s
Legal Ethics Handbook, supra note 63, the CBA’s Code of Professional Conduct
provides that: “Whenever the case can be settled reasonably, the lawyer should advise
and encourage the client to do so rather than commence or continue legal proceedings.
The lawyer should consider the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) for every
dispute and, if appropriate, the lawyer should inform the client of the ADR options and, if
so instructed, take steps to pursue those options.” CBA, Code of Professional Conduct, c.
IX.8, online: CBA <http://www.cba.org/CBA/activities/pdf/codeofconduct06.pdf>
(footnote omitted).

66

“CBA Task Force Report”, supra note 32 at 62-63. For a discussion of these reforms
and obligations, see “Dispute Resolution, Access to Civil Justice and Legal Education”,
supra note 8 at 750.
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treatment of ADR67 – have dramatically increased their focus on ADR and
related courses and training. As I have written elsewhere,
The face of the legal academy, like other justice system
stakeholders, has also changed over the past three decades.
Included in this change are the teaching and research of
dispute resolution, which have clearly taken on new and
critical importance. For example, in American law schools
in 1976, “there was no subject category for ADR or
mediation.” In 1992, more than 94 percent of these schools
offered dispute resolution courses. And the trend did not
stop then. Since 1999, “the level of interest in dispute
resolution – and in particular in the teaching of dispute
resolution – has risen exponentially.” A 2002 American
commentary indicated that “more than 500 law professors
identify themselves as teaching ADR.”
A similar
“exponential[]” increase in dispute resolution teaching has
occurred in Canada. According to the “CBA Survey,” “it is
clear that there is increased interest in and emphasis on
[A]DR in all law schools.”68
Taken together, the expression of all of these voices and
preferences – federal and provincial governments (expressed in the form
of significant court reforms), judges, lawyers, law societies, bar
associations, law schools and clients – has led to a clear and increasing
privatization of much of the civil justice system.

VI. ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM
The second part of the public dispute resolution system that I focus
on in this article is the administrative system, and in particular,
privatization initiatives within federal and provincial administrative
67

68

See supra note 32.

“Dispute Resolution, Access to Civil Justice and Legal Education”, supra note 8 at
754-755 (citations omitted). For further materials on the issue of ADR and legal
education, see Trevor C. W. Farrow, “Dispute Resolution and Legal Education: A
Bibliography” (2005) 7 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 119.
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processes. In the same way that courts play a central role in our processes
of democratic governance, so too do administrative regimes. This role can
be seen clearly in the mission statement of the Québec Human Rights
Tribunal (QHRT), for example, which states that the QHRT “contributes
in its own way, as part of the third pillar of government, to the building of
an egalitarian society, with proper regard for the principles of fundamental
justice and procedural fairness.”69
Research for this part of the article involved searching hundreds of
provincial and federal statutes and legislative provisions regarding
administrative-based dispute resolution processes. It also involved
searching publicly-available materials for many of these regimes in search
of information regarding non-statute-based materials on administrative
dispute resolution processes that engage some privatization component.
This research turned up hundreds of instances of the use of mediation,
arbitration or other forms of ADR tools within administrative legislation
databases (several of these instances are discussed below).70

A. FEDERAL PROCESSES
There are many examples of federal administrative processes that
actively encourage and engage various privatizing tools.71 For example,
the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC), established pursuant to

69

QHRT, “The Human Rights Tribunal”, online: Québec Government
<http://www.tribunaux.qc.ca/mjq_en/TDP/index-tdp.html>.

70

Like with the privatization reforms in the civil justice system discussed above,
reference must be made to the clear government preferences and policies – discussed
supra part IV – that have also led to the inclusion of various privatizing tools in these
administrative tribunal initiatives.

71

As mentioned, numerous federal administrative regimes actively promote and employ
privatizing initiatives as part of their dispute resolution processes. In addition to those
discussed in this part of this article, see e.g. the Immigration and Refugee Board of
Canada, Immigration Appeal Division (IAD), “Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
Program Protocols” (amended 13 January 2003), online: Government of Canada
<http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/references/legal/iad/adr/protoc_e.htm>, Canadian
Transportation Agency, “Resolving Disputes Through Mediation”, online: Government
of Canada <http://www.cta-otc.gc.ca/mediation/disputes/index_e.html#1/>.
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the Canadian Human Rights Act,72 has adopted a wide-ranging ADR
program that actively promotes the simplification and privatization of
many disputes brought to the CHRC. According to the CHRC’s materials:
The Commission actively promotes ADR with disputing
parties and with other interested groups because it is timely
and effective. In February 2003, the Commission created
the ADR Services Branch with a mandate to strengthen the
service and actively promote it with stakeholders. The
Branch offers two forms of ADR: mediation and
conciliation.73
Within its former 1999 pilot project and now within its established
ADR programs, which in 2005 were brought under the newly created
Dispute Resolution Branch, the use of ADR has been quite wide-spread
and reportedly successful. According to its most recetly-available annual
report, nearly half of the cases brought to the CHRC in 2006 were settled,
mostly using a CHRC-appointed conciliator or mediator.74
As is discussed further below,75 one of the important aspects of the
CHRC’s approach to ADR is its recognition that not all cases are suitable
for ADR. However, notwithstanding this recognition, it maintains a clear
preference for resolving many cases using one of its ADR resources. As
the CHRC states, “ADR is not the answer to every human rights issue but
it is a healthier route to take than adjudication in many cases.”76
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R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, s. 26.
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CHRC, “Overview: Alternative Dispute Resolution, What is ADR?”, online:
Government of Canada <http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/adr/what_is_it-en.asp>.
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CHRC, 2006 Annual Report at 7 (Resources, Publications, Reports: “Effectiveness of
the Business Model”), online: Government of Canada <http://www.chrcccdp.ca/publications/ar_2006_ra/page7-en.asp>.
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See infra notes 76 and 172 and surrounding text.

CHRC, Overview, Alternative Dispute Resolution, “Why Use ADR?”, online:
Government of Canada <http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/adr/why_use_it-en.asp>.
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There are many reasons cited for pursuing ADR, all of which are
consistent with the general reasons behind most of the government and
civil justice reform initiatives discussed above.77 For example, according
to the CHRC, the “reasons to choose” ADR include that: it “works
quickly”; is “confidential”; is “better for participants and their future
relationships than confrontation and adjudication”; and the “participants
set the agenda” and the “solutions”.78
Another example of a federal process that actively promotes the
use of ADR tools is the Commission for Public Complaints Against the
RCMP (CPC), which was established in 1988 by the Federal Government.
The CPC is designed to provide a “civilian review” process regarding the
conduct of members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).79
According to the the CPC, it actively promotes the use of ADR for the
resolution of complaints:
Once the CPC analyst determines the relevant facts and
understands the goals of the complainant, the analyst
explains the citizen’s options for dealing with his or her
concern. In appropriate cases, the analyst invites the
complainant and the RCMP to work together informally to
resolve the complaint. The complainant always retains the
right to file a formal complaint.
Where the complainant elects to resolve the complaint
informally, the CPC analyst serves as a facilitator, helping
the complainant obtain information by enlisting the aid of
the senior RCMP officer in the jurisdiction where the
problem arose. When facilitating in this manner, the
analyst provides the RCMP with a summary of the concern

77

Supra parts IV and V.

78

CHRC, Overview, Alternative Dispute Resolution, “Why Use ADR?”, supra note 76.
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CPC, “Welcome”, online: Government of Canada <http://www.cpccpp.gc.ca/DefaultSite/Home/index_e.aspx?ArticleID=1>.
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expressed by the complainant, normally on the same day
that the citizen raises the concern.80
Again, the merits of this process are well-known. Speed, cost and
efficiency are important justifications for the CPC’s use of alternative –
more private – processes. However, it is clear that the CPC and the
RCMP, particularly given budgetary realities, encourage the use of ADR
to enable them to deploy their energies on matters that they view as more
pressing. For example, according to the CPC:
The informal resolution of complaints against members of
the RCMP has been highly successful – the needs of
complainants often can be addressed more quickly than
through the formal process. Informal resolution makes it
possible for both the CPC and the RCMP to deploy scarce
resources to higher priority work.81
Provided other endeavors are more pressing, of course that policy
approach makes sense (assuming the intake analyst who first receives the
complaint gets the complaint-channeling process correct). However, to
the extent that a case of significant public importance is run through the
CPC’s ADR channel – because of a bad decision by an intake analyst, bad
faith on the part of the RCMP or the CPC, or simply because of “scarce
resources” that are deemed to be needed for “higher priority work” –
concerns need to be raised. These are the concerns of this article (that are
further developed below).82 Given the active promotion of ADR by the
CPC, it is clear that – like the CHRC – its strong preference, which is also
in-line with the Federal Government’s stated preference,83 is to try to
resolve disputes using ADR tools.
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CPC, 2005-2006 Annual Report, “Informal resolution in action”, online: Government
of Canada <http://www.cpccpp.gc.ca/DefaultSite/Reppub/index_e.aspx?articleid=1203#3.5.1>.
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Ibid. (emphasis added).
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See e.g. infra part IX.
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See e.g. supra part IV.
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B. PROVINCIAL PROCESSES
As with the federal administrative regime, provincial processes are
increasingly promoting and employing privatizing initiatives as part of
their dispute resolution systems. Numerous examples were discovered in
the research for this article.84
As a preliminary matter, several provinces – including British
Columbia and Ontario – have enacted administrative legislation of general
application that allows for individual administrative regimes within those
jurisdictions to create and administer ADR processes. These legislative
initiatives are clearly in-line – and are in fact motivated by – the overall
government preferences in these and other jurisdictions to promote the use
of privatized dispute resolution mechanisms.85 For example, according to
the B.C. legislation, “The chair of the tribunal may appoint a member or
staff of the tribunal or other persons to conduct a dispute resolution
process.”86 Similarly in Ontario, tribunals are given broad authority to
develop and administer privatizing ADR regimes, including mandatory
regimes. According to the Statutory Powers Procedure Act,
A tribunal may make rules…classifying the types of
proceedings that come before it and setting guidelines as to
the procedural steps or processes (such as…alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms, expedited hearings) that
apply to each type of proceeding and the circumstances in
which other procedures may apply…

84

In addition to the tribunal processes discussed below, see e.g. the Alberta Energy and
Utilities Board (“AEUB”), “What about Appropriate Dispute Resolution?” online: AEUB
<http://www.eub.gov.ab.ca/bbs/public/adr/ADRPamphlet.pdf>.
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Discussed further supra part IV.
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Administrative Tribunals Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 45, s. 28(1).
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A rule…may provide that participation in an alternative
dispute resolution mechanism is mandatory or that it is
mandatory in certain specified circumstances.87
Of particular interest to the arguments presented in this article are
tribunals that deal with significant public interest values and resources.
One area of particular focus – in which these sorts of ADR mechanisms
have been put in place – includes the various provincial human rights
tribunal regimes. For example, the Manitoba Human Rights Commission
(MHRC) “encourages” the use of ADR processes as part of its overall
dispute resolution process.88 Similarly, the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal
(BCHRT) offers various forms of “off the record”89 ADR settlement
processes including mediation, early evaluation, structured negotiation and
final determinations on the merits.90
The policy reasons behind the BCHRT initiatives, again, include
speed, simplicity (often including reduced costs) and privacy.
Specifically, according to the BCHRT, parties “may be interested in a
settlement meeting for a number of reasons. Settlement meetings are often
the quickest and simplest method of resolving disputes, and they are
confidential. If there is a settlement, there will not be a public hearing.”91
Similar policy “advantages” are identified as part of the ADR-based
settlement initiatives of the Alberta Human Rights and Citizenship
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R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22, ss. 4.7, 4.8(4).
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MHRC, Annual Report 2005 at 9 (“Complaint Process – Overview: Mediation”),
online: Manitoba Government <http://www.gov.mb.ca/hrc/english/publications/annualreports/annual-report-05.pdf>.
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BCHRT, “Guide 4 – The Settlement Meeting” at 2, online: B.C. Government
<http://www.bchrt.bc.ca/guides_and_information_sheets/guides/Guide4_2005.pdf>.
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Ibid. at 1.
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Ibid. at 2 (emphasis added).
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Commission (AHRCC)92 and the Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission
(NSHRC). For example, according to the NSHRC:
While information from a Human Rights Board of Inquiry
hearing is made public, information exchanged during
settlement initiatives is kept confidential. This allows
participants of settlement initiatives to discuss their
situation openly and candidly without fear of
repercussion.93
Other provincial administrative bodies that deal with significant
public resource issues include environmental protection tribunals. Again,
in this segment of the administrative process, significant privatizing
initiatives have been put in place.
For example, the Alberta
Environmental Appeals Board (AEAB) – an independent body that
reviews decisions regarding development approval, water licenses,
reclamation certificates and enforcement orders94 – actively encourages
ADR. According to its materials, the AEAB “places a high value on its
mediation program and encourages participants to use mediation as the
primary way to resolve appeals that come before the Board.”95
In addition to its policy statements, the AEAB’s preference for
resolving disputes through its ADR process can also be seen from its
92

The AHRCC regime includes a “conciliation” process, which specifically provides the
parties to a complaint with a “without prejudice” (confidential) dispute resolution
alternative. AHRCC, Publications and Resources, Complaint Process, “Conciliation”,
online: Alberta Government
<http://www.albertahumanrights.ab.ca/publications/Information_Sheets/Text/Info_Compl
aint_Process.asp>.
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NSHRC, “Introduction to Settlement Initiatives”, online: Nova Scotia Government
<http://www.gov.ns.ca/humanrights/PDFdocs/Settlement_E.pdf>. Other provinces with
human rights tribunal regimes that employ similar kinds of private ADR process include
New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Ontario (see further infra notes 173-179
and surrounding text), P.E.I. and Saskatchewan.
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AEAB, “Welcome”, online: Alberta Government
<http://www.eab.gov.ab.ca/index.htm>.
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Ibid. (emphasis added).
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settlement statistics. For example, according to the AEAB’s mediation
information:
From April 1, 2004 to March 31, 2005, the Board held 18
mediations, all of which were successfully resolved,
resulting in a 100 percent success rate for this reporting
year. Since the Board’s inception in 1993, it has conducted
139 mediations with 116 being successfully resolved. This
reflects an overall success rate of 83 percent.96
Similar environmental assessment and protection issues are dealt
with by the Ontario Environmental Review Tribunal (OERT), which also
actively deploys ADR techniques for the resolution of disputes. For
example, according to the OERT:
Mediation is offered to all parties (except in matters under
the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act,
and Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act, 2001) and is
conducted after the preliminary hearing and generally 30
days prior to the commencement of the main hearing…The
Tribunal [in 2007-2008] will continue to offer these
services in every appeal and, upon request, in all
applications filed in order to encourage parties to resolve
their issues.97
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AEAB, 2004-2005 Annual Report at 24 (“Mediation Program”), online: Alberta
Government <http://www.eab.gov.ab.ca/pub/2004-05-AR.pdf>. By comparison, the
settlement rates using these sorts of ADR-based processes in the human rights tribunal
context are moderate to strong. For example, according to the AHRCC, more than 50
percent (394 complaints) of the 749 complaints that were resolved in the 2005-2006 year
(of a total of 778 complaint files opened) were resolved using the AHRCC’s conciliation
process. AHRCC, Annual Review, April 1, 2005-March 31, 2006 at 10 (“Conciliated
files”), online: Alberta Government
<http://www.albertahumanrights.ab.ca/publications/Annual_Review/Ann_Rev_0506.pdf>. Almost 60 percent were resolved that way the previous year at the AHRCC.
Ibid.
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OERT, 2007-2010 Business Plan at 4, 10, online: Ontario Government
<http://www.ert.gov.on.ca/>.
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Further, even after an initial settlement attempt, or if “parties
choose not to participate” following the preliminary hearing, mediation
services “are offered by the Tribunal throughout the Hearing process, upon
request.”98 Because a “number of the Tribunal Members are certified to
conduct mediation”,99 it is clear – even at the hearing stage – that
mediation is actively considered and promoted by the OERT.

C. SETTLEMENTS INVOLVING MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST
Notwithstanding policy-based provisions in various tribunal
regimes that often encourage or require mattes of “public interest” to
proceed to a tribunal hearing,100 or at least to be resolved pursuant to
public interest values,101 there are numerous cases being settled using
private ADR tools that involve matters of significant public interest and
importance that receive little or no public scrutiny or attention.
Some of these settlements involve matters that are discontinued
and not pursued at all through either the formal or informal tribunal
processes.102 Nothing further may be heard of these matters. Of those that
do continue into the system, many are resolved based on confidential
processes and are only reported on in a very summary fashion, if at all, in
the tribunal’s public materials. For example, private settlements at the
tribunal level have recently involved matters of public interest such as:
subsidized housing discrimination;103 physical disability and gender
98

OERT, Annual Report, April 1, 2005-March 31, 2006 at 4 (“Mediation”), online:
Ontario Government <http://www.ert.gov.on.ca/>.
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OERT, 2007-2010 Business Plan at 4 (“Mediation”), supra note 97.
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See e.g. AEAB, “About Mediation: When is Mediation not Appropriate?”, online:
Alberta Government <http://www.eab.gov.ab.ca/mediation_about.htm>. See also infra
notes 106 and 172 and surrounding text.
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See e.g. CHRC, Overview, Alternative Dispute Resolution, “Why Use ADR?”, supra
note 76. See also infra notes 171-172 and surrounding text.
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See e.g. AEAB, 2004-2005 Annual Report at 36, supra note 96.
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See e.g. MHRC, Annual Report 2005 at 11, supra note 88.
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discrimination, often in the context of employment and services;104
significant complaints about police mistreatment involving potential
discrimination of members of First Nations;105 environmental protection
matters;106 and immigration matters.107 It is the public interest aspect of
these privatized settlements that also brings these administrative tribunalbased ADR initiatives within the scope of the concerns developed further
below in this article.108

VII. NON-COURT OR TRIBUNAL-BASED LEGISLATIVE
ADR PROCESSES
The third aspect of the public dispute resolution system that I focus
on in this article is the growing and increasingly important aspect of the
system that lies in between the formal state-sanctioned court and
administrative regime-annexed privatization initiatives discussed in the
previous two parts of this article and the purely private realm of dispute
resolution processes that occur everyday completely outside of the state’s
influence. It is this third aspect of the system that was also fully engaged
in the Dealership case.109
What I am specifically talking about in this part of the article
typically involves arbitration processes that are set up pursuant to
agreements between individuals or private entities but that are, at the same
104

See e.g. AHRCC, Annual Review, April 1, 2005-March 31, 2006 at viii (“Resolution
and adjudication of human rights complaints: summary of results”), supra note 96.
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See e.g. CPC, 2006-2007 Annual Report, “Appendix 3: Informal Resolution of
Complaints”, online: Government of Canada <http://www.cpccpp.gc.ca/DefaultSite/Reppub/index_e.aspx?articleid=1439#8>.
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online:
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time, enabled by federal110 or provincial arbitration111 or mediation
statutes.112 They are, as such, hybrid processes in the sense that they are
partly public regimes given the enabling and sanctioning legislation
pursuant to which they receive many of their powers. And they are partly
private regimes in the sense that they are initiated by private agreement
and, once underway, they also allow parties essentially free reign to
conduct proceedings that are fully private and largely out of reach of all
state actors (including the courts). Perhaps the most convenient
recognition of this form of “privatization” is a recent minority judgment of
Bastarache and LeBel JJ. of the Supreme Court of Canada:
Exclusive arbitration clauses operate to create a “private
jurisdiction” that implicates the loss of jurisdiction of stateappointed forums for dispute resolution, such as ordinary
courts and administrative tribunals, rendering contractual
arbitration both different and exclusive of the later
entities…Contractual arbitration has also been described as
creating a “private justice system” for the parties:…“From
a theoretical standpoint, arbitration is a private justice
system that ordinarily arises out of an agreement. Thus, it
has a contractual source and an adjudicative function”…
What makes contractual arbitration a “private jurisdiction”
or “private justice system” is the degree of freedom the
parties have in choosing the manner in which their dispute
will be resolved:
Arbitration is therefore the settling of
disputes between parties who agree not to go
before the courts, but to accept as final the
decision of experts of their choice, in a place
of their choice, usually subject to laws
agreed upon in advance and usually under
110

See Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp.), c. 17.

111

See e.g. Alberta Arbitration Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-43.
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See Nova Scotia Commercial Mediation Act, S.N.S. 2005, c. 36.
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rules which avoid much of the formality,
niceties, proof and procedure required by the
courts…113
By way of background, the introduction and establishment of the
arbitral system in Canada – which largely tracks historic international
commercial arbitration developments – has also been recently summarized
by Deschamps J. of the Supreme Court of Canada:
International arbitration law is strongly influenced by two
texts drafted under the auspices of the United Nations: the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (“New York
Convention”), and the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/40/17
(1985) (“Model Law”).
The New York Convention entered into force in 1959.
Article II of the Convention provides that a court of a
contracting state that is seized of an action in a matter
covered by an arbitration clause must refer the parties to
arbitration. At present, 142 countries are parties to the
Convention. The accession of this many countries is
evidence of a broad consensus in favour of the institution of
arbitration…Canada acceded to the New York Convention
on May 12, 1986.
The Model Law is another fundamental text in the area of
international commercial arbitration. It is a model for
legislation that the UN recommends that states take into
consideration in order to standardize the rules of
international commercial arbitration. The Model Law was
113

Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, supra note 9 at paras. 132133 (references omitted). See further ibid. at para. 200, at which Bastarache and
LeBel JJ. state that “the effect of exclusive arbitration clauses is to create a ‘private
jurisdiction’ that implicates the loss of jurisdiction of state-appointed authorities for
dispute resolution, such as domestic courts and administrative tribunals.”
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drafted in a manner that ensured consistency with the
New York Convention…
The final text of the Model Law was adopted on June 21,
1985 by the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”). In its explanatory note on the
Model Law, the UNCITRAL Secretariat states that it:
…reflects a worldwide consensus on
principles and important issues
international arbitration practice. It
acceptable to States of all regions and
different legal or economic systems of
world.

the
of
is
the
the

(Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL
secretariat on the Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, at
para. 2)
In 1986, Parliament enacted the Commercial Arbitration
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 17 (2nd Supp.), which was based on
the Model Law…114
Provincial arbitration legislation has similarly been enacted across
Canada that also reflects this widespread acceptance of the policies and
Key
practices of this world-wide dispute resolution process.115
components of arbitration legislation typically include: broad subject
matter coverage; significant ability to vary many provisions of the
legislation; limited court intervention; wide procedural flexibility; binding

114

Ibid. at paras. 38-41, Deschamps J. (majority).

115

See e.g. supra note 111.
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awards; limited appeal rights; powers of enforcement; and powers to
award costs.116 In short, once commenced:
…arbitration is a creature that owes its existence to the will
of the parties alone…the parties to an arbitration agreement
are free, subject to any mandatory provisions by which they
are bound, to choose any place, form and procedures they
consider appropriate…The choice of procedure does not
alter the institution of arbitration in any of these cases. The
rules become those of the parties, regardless of where they
are taken from.117
Of particular significance to typical arbitrating parties, and to this
article, is the overwhelming purpose of arbitration legislation to provide
parties with a powerful, flexible, and confidential dispute resolution
process that is largely out of the reach of the public court system. This
underlying policy principle can be seen in the many legislative debates
that led to the development of these regimes. For example, according to
legislative debates regarding Ontario’s arbitration legislation:
The purpose of the Arbitration Act, 1991, is to provide a
framework for the private settlement of disputes that will
be as clear as possible for those who use it, while
preserving the fairness of the process. The ability of an
unwilling party to delay or derail an arbitration has been
reduced to a minimum. The parties are generally free to set
their own rules for arbitrations – that is, to override the act
– so they have a great deal of flexibility. However, the law
and the courts will ensure that the parties stick to their

116

See e.g. Alberta Arbitration Act, supra note 111 at ss. 2, 3, 6, 20, 37, 44-45, 48, 49 and
53.
117

Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, supra note 9 at paras. 5152, Deschamps J. (majority). See further ibid. at para. 133, Bastarache and LeBel
JJ., discussed further supra at note 113 and surrounding text.
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agreement to arbitrate, do not proceed unfairly, and abide
by the result when it is given.118
Further policy debates leading to the enactment of these powerful
legislative tools belie many legislators’ intentions to increase the use of
arbitration as a way to off-set the use of public resources in resolving
certain civil matters as well as some legislators’ views that arbitration
should even be mandated for some commercial circumstances. These
sentiments can be seen, for example, in the following statements in the
debates leading up to amendments to Manitoba’s arbitration legislation:
We on this side acknowledge the value of arbitration as a
way to resolve disputes. Arbitration usually costs less to
the disputing parties. At least, we recognize that it can cut
down on some costly legal costs and pretrial procedures. It
certainly costs less to the taxpaying public, because the
expensive judicial system is not called on to resolve the
disputes. Arbitration is often, although not always – but
usually faster than litigation. It is also informal, accessible
and flexible, which meet the needs of the parties to a
greater extent than formal litigation. Of course, arbitration
also allows privacy. It is confidential, as long as one of the
parties does not pursue an appeal.
It is clear that arbitration does have a very important role in
our society and, indeed, it is my firm belief that we should
rely more on alternative dispute resolution. We should be
looking for not only a greater reliance on arbitration but
other ways of resolving disputes outside of the courts.

I think one of the greatest arguments to support my belief is
that when there are limited resources to deal with conflicts
between individuals and limited resources to deal with
118

Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), (5 November
1991) at 1550 (Hon. Howard Hampton) (emphasis added).
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Criminal Code infractions, we have to think why are we
putting so many resources into the resolution of disputes
between, for example, two large corporations that may have
extensive resources and, yet, are going head to head in a
battle over many years…We really, I think, have to think in
larger terms about how we are using public resources to
solve disputes between certain kinds of parties and, in that
regard, I wonder if we should not be looking toward a more
affirmative statement or a more effective way of getting
parties to use arbitration as an alternative to civil litigation,
including requiring arbitration clauses in certain
commercial contracts.119
The freedom and power that are clearly provided by these
legislative regimes has made arbitration increasingly popular, particularly
as a method to resolve commercial disputes. In the United States, for
example, reports indicate that total case filings for the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) dramatically increased over the 10 year
period from 1993 to 2003 (from over 60,000 cases in 1993 to over 230,000
cases in 2003).120 In Canada, ADR – specifically including arbitration – is
a similarly favoured dispute resolution regime, particularly within the
corporate sector. For example, a number of significant corporate entities
and leading Canadian law firms have signed the ADR Institute of
Canada’s “Dispute Resolution Pledge”, which “commits signatories to
willingly consider and suggest alternative dispute resolution processes in
appropriate situations prior to turning to the courts.”121
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Manitoba, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), Vol. XLVII,
No. 59, Orders of the Day (11 June 1997) at 1520 (Hon. Gord Mackintosh).
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Reported in Thomas J. Stipanowich, “ADR and the ‘Vanishing Trial’: The Growth
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ADR Institute of Canada, Rules & Pledges, “Dispute Resolution Pledge: A Corporate
Policy Statement”, online: ADR Institute of Canada <http://www.amic.org/>. For a list
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Further, not only is arbitration increasingly popular, it is also in
large measure fully recognized as an established part of (or alternative to)
the overall civil justice system. This recognition starts at the top of our
Canadian court system. For example, according to LeBel J.:
In general, arbitration is not part of the state’s judicial
system, although the state sometimes assigns powers or
functions directly to arbitrators. Nonetheless, arbitration is
still, in a broader sense, a part of the dispute resolution
system the legitimacy of which is fully recognized by the
legislative authorities.122

Taking this recognition of arbitration one step further, Bastarache
and LeBel JJ. of the Supreme Court of Canada recently recognized the
further policy of legislatures, building on Desputeaux, which “now accepts
arbitration as a valid form of dispute resolution and, moreover, seeks to
promote its use.”123 One primary method by which the court has promoted
the use of arbitration is through its deferential approach to arbitration
challenges, which it recently confirmed as follows:
It is…well established that the effect of a valid undertaking
to arbitrate is to remove the dispute from the jurisdiction of
the ordinary courts of law…There is consequently no
question that, if the arbitration agreement is valid and
relates to the dispute, the Superior Court has no jurisdiction
to hear the case and must refer the parties to arbitration.124
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Desputeaux v. Éditions Chouette (1987) inc., 2003 SCC 17, [2003] 1 S.C.R.
178 at para. 41.
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In addition to recognizing the well-established nature of valid
contractual agreements to arbitrate, the Court has also recently confirmed
that it will only disrupt the jurisdiction of an arbitrator in limited
circumstances.125

VIII. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PRIVATE JUSTICE
The justifications for these privatizing trends – typically spoken of
in terms of benefits – are well documented and include: efficiency in terms
of time, money and resource management; the reduction of backlogs and
costs; increased access to a dispute resolution system; the maintenance of
individual (and community) relationships through improved dialogue,
tailored outcomes and voluntary compliance with results; freedom to
choose laws, processes and decision-makers; improved public satisfaction
with dispute resolution regimes; and, of course, protection from public
scrutiny through rules of confidentiality.126

125

According to Deschamps J.:
First of all, I would lay down a general rule that in any case
involving an arbitration clause, a challenge to the arbitrator’s
jurisdiction must be resolved first by the arbitrator. A court should
depart from the rule of systematic referral to arbitration only if the
challenge to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction is based solely on a question of
law…
If the challenge requires the production and review of factual
evidence, the court should normally refer the case to arbitration, as
arbitrators have, for this purpose, the same resources and expertise as
courts. Where questions of mixed law and fact are concerned, the court
hearing the referral application must refer the case to arbitration unless
the questions of fact require only superficial consideration of the
documentary evidence in the record.
Before departing from the general rule of referral, the court must
be satisfied that the challenge to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction is not a
delaying tactic and that it will not unduly impair the conduct of the
arbitration proceeding. This means that even when considering one of
the exceptions, the court might decide that to allow the arbitrator to rule
first on his or her competence would be best for the arbitration process.
Ibid. at paras. 84-86. See also Rogers Wireless Inc. v. Muroff, 2007 SCC 35 at para.
11.
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In large measure, a significant underlying theme of many of these
benefits sounds in the principle of efficiency, which has come essentially
to define the modern discourse surrounding our civil justice systems. As
Héctor Fix-Fierro has noticed:
[E]fficiency…has penetrated the legal and judicial systems
at all levels and dimensions, from the level of society as a
whole to the day-to-day operation of the judicial process,
from the institutional role performed by adjudication in
society to the organisational context of judicial
decisions…In other words: far from being an alien value
with respect to the legal and judicial process, efficiency has
simply become an inseparable part of the structure of
expectations we address to the legal system.127
This efficiency-based argument, as I have summarized elsewhere,
essentially proceeds as follows:
When a dispute involves the private rights of A v. B, and
further, when two “consenting adults” (including
corporations) have chosen to move their dispute off the
busy docket of our public court system and into the private
boardroom of an arbitrator or mediator, current views
suggest that justice is being served. The argument is that
the resolution of disputes – like other goods and services –
should not be deprived of the benefits of freedom of

Frank E. A. Sander & N. H. Rogers, Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation, and
Other Processes (New York: Aspen Law and Business, 1999) at 8.
127

Héctor Fix-Fierro, Courts, Justice and Efficiency: A Socio-Legal Study of Economic
Rationality in Adjudication (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2003) at 235 (footnote
omitted) [Courts, Justice and Efficiency]. Note, however, that Fix-Fierro further
comments that “economic rationality is not, and should not necessarily be, the prevalent
value or the overriding concern in the context of legal decision-making.” Ibid.
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movement and contract in an efficiency-seeking, innovative
and expanding market economy.128
An example of this form of argument is articulated by Gillian
Hadfield, who has forcefully advocated for the privatization of law –
particularly commercial law – in the overall spirit of “significantly
decreasing the cost of law.”129 This argument is also similar to that raised
by the Honourable Gord Mackintosh, for example, in the legislative
debates surrounding Manitoba’s arbitration legislation.130 Hadfield –
although recognizing that the justice system plays several important public
roles in our modern democracies including protecting “individual rights” –
argues that when it comes to commercial law, the state should download –
privatize – much of its dispute resolution functions:
…the legal system…performs important economic
functions such as providing the structure and regulation
necessary for the operation of efficient markets. The
economic sphere of law regularly deals with relationships
that involve only corporate entities. Private legal regimes
could provide this law without raising legitimacy
concerns.131
Hadfield summarizes the basis for her argument as follows:
The rules we want in these interactions [involving
corporate entities] are the rules that promote and facilitate
128
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efficient market relationships between corporations. In this
setting, we are not interested in what is fair or just between
two corporations; we are interested in what makes their
economic relationship as productive and valuable as
possible. That goal suggests the need to look for ways to
increase the role of markets in the process of developing
and administering the legal regimes that govern the
relationships between corporate entities.132
Hadfield’s argument rests essentially on four points: corporate
relationships are different than relationships involving “individual rights”;
the public need not be interested in the fairness of corporate relationships;
cost reduction can be achieved through efficiency-seeking private dispute
resolution mechanisms; and we should ultimately be guided by principles
of efficiency – not what is “fair or just” – when making fundamental
procedural policy choices in the context of commercial dispute
resolution.133
Clearly saving time, money, relationships and reputations, while at
the same time increasing market efficiencies are typically good things.
And if one-off dispute resolution statistics and results were the only
relevant factors by which to measure a dispute resolution regime,
particularly involving corporate entities, the discussion would essentially
be over. Unfortunately, this narrow – litigant-based – perspective is what
currently drives much of our public policy thinking and choices. For
example, when debating the addition of ADR into the B.C. Administrative
Tribunals Act,134 one Member of Parliament argued that:
What citizens want more often than not is an outcome and a
result rather than a process. They want their problems
solved. They want the relationship improved, they want the
132
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benefit they believe they’re entitled to, and they want
government to stop doing what it is that is harming them.135
As such, according to the same Member of Parliament,
Anything we can do to move forward dispute resolution so
that it happens sooner is, in my view, a step in the right
direction, and we are doing a lot as government to try to
encourage alternative dispute resolution not just in the
administrative justice system but across the justice system
as a whole. In fact, part of rethinking justice involves
rethinking the idea of alternative dispute resolution so that
it is no longer alternative but, rather, so that mediation,
settlement, conciliation and settlement conferences are all
part of the basic tools of all dispute resolution…136
The problem, however, is that while individuals and corporate
citizens do often care about the individual outcome of their case rather (or
at least typically more) than the process; when we think about the justice
system as a whole, process is fundamental to an overall viable public
justice system. Arguments that focus purely on efficiency or purely on
individual, one-off interests lose this overall societal perspective. As is
discussed in the next part of this article, there is clearly more going on in
dispute resolution regimes (including at the commercial level) than simply
the resolution of one-off disputes. The fundamental and just regulation of
society is at stake. And unlike Hadfield, I am strongly of the view that the
state should maintain not only a strong interest in the resolution of
disputes involving “the lives and relationships of its citizens”; it should
also do so in the context of disputes involving “corporate-to-corporate
commercial dealings.”137

135

British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, Vol. 25, No. 15 (18 May 2004) at
11192 (Hon. G. Plant).

136

Ibid.

137

“Privatizing Commercial Law”, supra note 129 at 45.

48

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 04 NO. 04

IX. CONCERNS ABOUT PRIVATIZATION
First, as a threshold matter, even the many stated efficiency-related
benefits of ADR are not without their doubters. For example, some
studies have shown that purported reductions in cost and increases in
speed and efficiency are not always present in court-annexed ADR
processes, and in any event, do not always militate in favour of increased
efficiency of courts to which those ADR processes are annexed.138 But
even if we assume these benefits to obtain – and it is the case that they
often (although certainly not always) do – there are still remaining
fundamental concerns that need to be seriously considered and discussed.

A. IMPOVERISHED DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON LAW
Critics of ADR and privatization point to the potential slow decline
in the number of precedents created and the resulting erosion of the overall
corpus of the common law as a result of ADR’s popularity. An early but
still authoritative example of this critique comes from Owen Fiss, who
raised the concern that widespread settlement strategies would negatively
impact the court’s ability, particularly appellate courts in public interest
litigation, to develop the common law.139 Tracy Walters McCormack has
also – more recently – raised similar concerns.140 Eroding the sources of
common law is clearly a concern, particularly given the current force and
trajectory of privatizing trends.

B. LACK OF PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS
A second concern raised by critics of ADR and privatization
involves ADR’s procedural protections, or potential lack thereof. Clearly
one of the main benefits of ADR, as was expressly recognized, for
example, in the 1991 legislative debates surrounding Ontario’s arbitration
legislation, is its wide-ranging flexibility, whereby parties are “generally
138
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free to set their own rules…so they have a great deal of flexibility.”141
However, with flexibility comes a potential significant cost. Specifically,
my concern here, as I have argued elsewhere, is that without adequate
public scrutiny, primarily through open court processes and the
publication of precedents, there is a real danger that parties, particularly
including those with power, will use the private system to circumvent
public policies, accountability and basic notions of procedural fairness.142
These concerns about power and procedural fairness were clearly
central to the debates surrounding Ontario’s recent amendments to its
arbitration legislation in the area of family law. Because I have written
elsewhere on this subject, I will only very briefly develop it further
here.143 In a nutshell, prior to 2006, parties could use Ontario’s
Arbitration Act, 1991 for the resolution of a wide variety of disputes,
including family law disputes. In so doing, they could essentially contract
out of the application of progressive substantive and procedural family law
protections. Recently, the Ontario Government – following significant
public debate regarding the use of Ontario’s arbitration legislation to
sanction faith-based dispute resolution processes that potentially
discriminated against women and children – sought to limit those
opportunities through amendments to its arbitration legislation contained
in the Family Statute Law Amendment Act, 2006 (FSLAA).144 The results
of the amendments essentially were to exclude family disputes from the
benefits of arbitration legislation unless the process employed by the
parties complied with “the law of Ontario or another Canadian
jurisdiction…”145
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This move by the Ontario Government was clearly made given the
obvious public interest issues engaged in family law disputes, and in
particular, gender, religious, child-welfare and community-welfare
interests. There is no doubt, as Hadfield would likely argue,146 that these
important values are typically much more clearly identified as public
interest values than those involving the rights and interests of corporations
and other private actors in non-family settings. However, there are
certainly occasions when the issues at stake in corporate or other private
law disputes warrant significant public scrutiny. And in those cases, in my
view, the public interest should be engaged through active public scrutiny
of private proceedings. As such, unlike Hadfield (as I argue above147),
justice is engaged not just when the rights of citizens are involved, but also
– often – when the rights of corporations are involved.
Here is where we arrive back at the relevance of the Dealership
case to the arguments in this article. Because in the Dealership case, I
experienced – first-hand – numerous violations of basic procedural
protections that militated to the significant detriment of John. For
example, on one occasion, after repeated deposition requests for a series of
documents and repeated denials by the Corporation’s lawyers about their
existence or relevance, a witness for the Corporation inadvertently
(although properly) disclosed the fact that the documents – with
knowledge of their lawyers – were in the trunk of his car that was parked
just outside of the office in which the deposition was taking place. After a
break to retrieve the documents (which turned out to be clearly relevant), it
became clear that the lawyers for the Corporation were actively trying to
conceal the existence of these documents, which contained several
problematic statements relating to the corporate structure of the
Corporation that undermined their theory of the case.
On another occasion, during a deposition of a different officer of
the Corporation, my line of cross-examination questions was interrupted
by counsel for the Corporation, who proceeded to insist on taking a break
“to speak to [his]…witness”. After the break, the witness returned to the
146
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room and started to answer my questions with a very different, much less
forthcoming demeanour. He then quickly lost his temper, pointed at his
own lawyer and at me and said – in a loud, flustered and almost panicked
voice – that he was tired of “the two of us telling him what to say” in his
evidence during the deposition. Never has there been clearer evidence on
a deposition record of a lawyer being caught having coached his client
during a break to change or tailor his evidence. Because the Dealership
case was being dealt with pursuant to a private arbitration regime, the
typical procedural safeguards provided for by a court were not
immediately present to curb or punish the behaviour of the Corporation or
its lawyers in these contexts of document hiding and witness coaching.
Now my reader might ask at this stage that, although unfortunate
for John, what do these procedural injustices in a one-off corporate dispute
have to do with wider public interest values? First of all, as it turned out,
the Dealership case was not an isolated dispute, but rather the result of a
pattern of potentially fraudulent conduct on the part of the Corporation.
Throughout our retainer with John, we received a relatively steady stream
of anecdotal information about similarly situated dealers in the United
States finding themselves in the same position vis-à-vis the Corporation
and its deceptive and aggressive business practices. We also learned,
again anecdotally, about a number of similar arbitrations being pursued by
or against the Corporation. Because of the strict confidentiality provisions
surrounding those proceedings, however, we were not able to obtain
evidence about those other arbitrations, either through informal inquiries
or through repeated efforts through the production and deposition stages of
the proceeding. Denials of other proceedings were all that were
forthcoming from the Corporation’s officers and its lawyers.
However, approximately two weeks before our arbitration hearing
was set to begin, I received in the mail a list of approximately 30 or 40
similar, active arbitral proceedings in which the Corporation was involved.
The list – that was included in a report to the Corporation’s auditors that
its lawyers had mistakenly sent to me – established clearly that the
conduct engaged in by the Corporation with John was a pattern of repeated
conduct that had led to similar disputes with numerous other dealers across
the United States. In the face of this list, it seemed difficult for the
Corporation to continue to voice – in good faith – its denial of the
existence of these proceedings or their relevance. Unfortunately, because
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of professional and evidentiary reasons that prohibited us from leading the
evidence in the arbitration, that is exactly what the Corporation did: it
proceeded at the arbitration as though those other proceedings did not
exist. And the arbitrator’s judgment did not take into account the fact that
the conduct about which John was complaining was a course of conduct in
which the Corporation was engaging with dozens of other dealers across
the United States.
Second, beyond the specifics of John’s dispute with the
Corporation and all of the other cases involving the Corporation, the
potential ripple effect that cases such as the Dealership case could have on
corporate culture, decision–making and resource allocation – for example
within numerous similarly-situated North American franchise sectors – is
significant. It is this behaviour modification discussion – and its overall
place in the regulation of society – to which I turn next.

C. NEGATIVE IMPACT ON DEMOCRACY
A typical – but very narrow and misguided – understanding of the
purpose of a civil justice system is that it exists primarily to resolve
disputes. For example, according to a very recent treatment of civil justice
reform by Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman, the “main goal of the court
system is to differentiate between those who obeyed the law and those
who did not, and to administer the disputes that are brought before it
according to substantive law.”148 Even more traditional accounts often
suffer from a similar narrowness. According to Berlins and Dyer, the
“courtroom” has for “centuries…been the setting for the final settlement
of disputes…”149 Of course Klement and Neeman, as well as Berlins and
Dyer, are partly correct: dispute resolution is one of the purposes of a civil
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justice system. However, it certainly is not its only purpose and is not
always its most important purpose.
There are many aspects to the way we order ourselves and our
affairs in society. At the personal level, custom, religion, morality,
tradition, etc., all often play determining roles. However, as W. H.
Jennings has pointed out,
As soon as man began to live in groups, rules became
necessary to govern his relations with his fellows. Even in
the most primitive forms of society both the rights of the
individual and the common interests of the community
were bound to emerge and create a need for governing
social relationships.150
Today, these social relationships – at the level of civil society – are
governed by two primary regulatory tools: legislation and adjudication.
And of these two tools, adjudication plays a central function in our
regulatory state. As Héctor Fix-Fierro comments, courts “participate
openly in the constitutional and political process...” and have become a
“…real branch of government, at least in the sense that they now play an
important role in shaping the general direction of society.”151
The basic premise therefore behind a robust public dispute
resolution system, in addition to resolving disputes, is to create a fair,
predicable, accessible, just and relatively common regulatory system for
all. For example, when referring to the development of the modern courts
in England after the passing of the Judicature Acts of 1873-1875 and into
the 20th century, R. M. Jackson has argued that the “growth and expansion
of the King’s Courts was doubtless an excellent thing for the building of a
150
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uniform law and standard of justice in the country…”152 And a system of
justice includes not only tools for retrospective dispute resolution, but also
robust tools for prospective behaviour modification and societal regulation
through processes of adjudication.
There are at least three key components of the adjudicative side of
this equation. First, public civil justice systems are clearly central actors
in the adjudicative process. As S. M. Waddams has summarized, in
addition to “statutes”, the “study of law is, to a large extent, the study
of…judicial decisions.”153 Second, as argued above,154 in our highly
complex and regulated democracies, the administrative system plays an
equally, if not more important role. Again as Waddams has discussed, in a
“highly regulated state…there are thousands of administrative bodies
exercising very important regulatory and adjudicative powers…[A]s a
practical matter, the direct effect of regulatory tribunals is often of more
importance than the direct effect of legislation or of judicial decisions.”155
Third, again as argued above,156 in addition to the state funded and created
civil courts and administrative processes, there is a vast body of
“alternative” justice – largely in the form or arbitration, mediation, etc. –
that, as the Supreme Court of Canada recognized in Desputeaux, forms a
“fully recognized” part of a state’s overall adjudicative process.157
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Tribunals and courts, therefore, not only keep legislation in check
through hearings, trials and processes of judicial review,158 they also –
through both the full light and the shadow of the common law – create a
body of law that directly governs and indirectly guides much of what we
do in our daily lives.159 This includes both individuals and corporations.
As such, far from simple mechanical dispute ending tools, civil dispute
resolution regimes play a central role in the regulatory processes of
modern Western democracies.160
Given this central role in processes of democratic governance, the
move to privatize public civil dispute resolution regimes has profound
implications for how we govern ourselves in a free and democratic
society. Put simply, to the extent that we are privatizing public civil
dispute resolution systems, we are essentially privatizing a significant part
of the way democracy is realized.
Here again we return to the Dealership case. By seeing that case as
simply an A v. B case of only limited private (commercial) interest, there
is no need to concern ourselves with the procedural violations that
occurred in that case or even the potentially fraudulent conduct that
negatively impacted John and 30 or 40 similarly situated United States
158
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dealers. According to Hadfield, for example, we are not concerned with
the “fair[ness]” of that commercial case.161 However, if we see that case,
instead, as a potential opportunity not only to shut down the problematic
conduct of a significant United States goods and service provider but also
to send a significant signal to other similarly-situated individual and
corporate actors (and lawyers) in society about the negative repercussions
of engaging in that sort of conduct, opinions, policies, resource allocation,
overall corporate behaviour and potentially legislation (regulating both
corporations and lawyers) would likely change. That is the power of the
adjudicative aspect to our processes of democratic governance.
Privatizing those tool risks losing that power.

X. FUTURE THINKING: JUSTICE MUST TRUMP
EFFICIENCY
The shift that I see being required – to avoid further jeopardizing
the regulatory power of adjudication – is a shift in the overall mindset of
those who work in and think about public civil dispute resolution
processes and their reform. Put simply, all civil justice policy, reform
thinking and implementation needs to start from a bottom-line premise
based not on notions of efficiency – where, as Héctor Fix-Fierro has
recognized,162 it currently lies – but rather on robust notions of justice.
The two premises are not necessarily or always mutually exclusive. Often
when disputes are resolved more efficiently, justice obtains.163 However,
on occasions when they are mutually exclusive, and in any event, justice
must be the ultimate arbiter when it comes to making significant policy
choices and resource allocation decisions at all levels and regarding all
players – individual and corporate – within our systems of civil justice.
To do otherwise risks one of the very foundational aspects of our
processes of democratic governance. As the Chief Justice of Canada
recently acknowledged,
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Courts have been promoting various forms of out-of-court
mediation and arbitration as a more effective way of
achieving settlement and dealing with many civil cases.
This is good. But the fact is, some cases should go to court.
They raise legal issues that should be considered by the
courts for the good of the litigants and the development of
the law.164
In my view this shift in mindset and this cautionary sensibility
about ADR should obtain at all three levels of the civil dispute resolution
system – courts, tribunals and arbitration panels – that I discuss in this
article.

A. COURTS
In the operation of civil courts, for example, all players –
specifically including masters and judges – should not be overly pressured
into realizing economic efficiencies – backlog and cost reduction, etc. – to
the down-playing of fundamental principles of justice that celebrate the
public resolution of policy-making disputes, which do not only include
landmark Charter and other public law cases but also, sometimes, include
the day-to-day cases of A v. B. (involving both private individuals and
corporations, like the Dealership case).
I am aware that masters and judges already have the power to –
and sometimes do – make these sorts of decisions to privilege a sensibility
of justice over that of efficiency in the context of choices regarding ADR
and privatization. For example, when deciding on whether to exempt a
case from mandatory mediation, the court has the power to move a case
off a mediation list for several reasons, including where matters of
significant public interest are involved. In O. (G.) v. H. (C.D.), Kiteley J.
articulated the following considerations in these sorts of circumstances:
164
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At the risk of generalizing from the few reasons for
decision and from the somewhat cryptic explanation made
by the local mediation co-ordinators in the list tracking
exemptions, it would appear that the following criteria are
relevant to whether an exemption order should be granted:
-

-

whether the parties have already engaged in a
form of dispute resolution, and, in the interests
of reducing cost and delay, they ought not to be
required to repeat the effort; [and]
whether the issue involves a matter of public
interest or importance which requires
adjudication in order to establish an authority
which will be persuasive if not binding on other
cases…165

It was the second of these types of considerations – considerations
involving matters of public interest – that animated Master Beaudoin’s
reasons in Wilson v. Canada (Attorney General).166 In that case, the
applicants challenged s. 25(4) of the Public Services Superannuation Act,
R.S.C 1985 c. P-36 – regarding the definition of a “surviving spouse”,
which included the words “opposite sex” – as violating s. 15 of the
Charter. The moving parties in the particular motion before the Master
sought leave to have the proceedings exempted from a mandatory referral
to mediation, as – in their view – it would “not be productive given the
subject matter of the Application.”167 Master Beaudoin, when granting the
motion, gave the following reasons:
The Ottawa Practice Direction with respect to mandatory
referral to mediation contemplates a referral to interestbased mediation. Through the intervention of a third party
neutral, the parties are encouraged to consider a resolution
of their dispute on terms that consider their broader
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interests rather than a strict consideration of their rights;
often requiring the parties to arrive at a form of
compromise. In this instance, the resolution of this
application requires the determination of the rights of the
individual applicants, not only for themselves but for all
others who are similarly situated.
There is no precedent to guide the court in this matter. An
article entitled The Adequacy of the Adversarial System in
Charter Litigation by Robin S. Sharma in the National
Journal of Constitutional Law [3 N.J.C.L.], in my view,
correctly sets out the approach to be taken. At p. 119 the
author cites two reasons why Alternative Dispute
Resolution techniques may not be appropriate in resolving
Charter disputes. With regard to the second reason the
author states:
...constitutional cases, so often involving
issues of paramount societal concern, must
have the ability to influence and shape future
conduct and to prompt necessary
behavioural changes.
This requires
adjudication within a public forum such as a
law court where the public interest is
represented and binding, effective decisions
are rendered.
While the author goes on to suggest that certain cases exist
where compromise/settlement procedures should be
considered seriously, this is not one of those cases. The
ultimate disposition of this application will have
implications for same sex couples throughout the country
and accordingly, leave to be exempted from the referral is
granted.168
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Mediation and other ADR processes should continue not to be
encouraged in these sorts of high profile public interest cases. However,
what counts as “public interest” should not be viewed narrowly as only to
include these sorts of Charter challenges. While these cases are clearly
important, they are not the only cases that act to shape the conduct and
relationships of day-to-day people on day-to-day issues. All cases should
be seen as potential candidates to be moved off the privatization track and
onto – or back into – a public track. Current and overwhelming
preferences for efficiency, particularly in the moments of a civil case when
decisions about case management or court-annexed ADR processes are
made, militate against this tendency. And not only should this shift in
underlying preferences occur at the operational stage of the court’s work,
but also at the policy and reform levels as well.

B. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES
The same shift in sensibility needs also to obtain at the
administrative level. Clearly – to-date – government preferences for
including and encouraging ADR at all levels of operation has resulted in
the significant use of ADR throughout the federal and provincial
administrative system.169 According to the settlement rates and statistics
of some of these tribunals, the use of ADR is becoming the norm.170
Like with the court system, the problem is not that tools do not
exist for these sorts of justice-based considerations. They do. For
example, notwithstanding the CHRC’s preference and active promotion of
ADR when resolving complaints,171 it still retains the jurisdiction to
review complaints on a case-by-case basis to determine whether public
policy considerations militate against the use of ADR:
The Commission’s focused litigation strategy allows it to
support the parties at pre-tribunal mediation, while it
concentrates on vigorously pursuing high-impact, public
169

See supra part VI.

170

See e.g. supra note 96 and surrounding text.
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interest cases before the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal.
On a case-by-case basis, the Commission determines the
scope and nature of its participation before the Tribunal
after assessing such factors as whether the case raises broad
policy issues, relates to major policy concerns, or raises
new points of law. The Commission can also intervene in
precedent-setting cases before courts and administrative
tribunals dealing with human rights issues.172
Of course “high-impact” cases that involve the “public interest”
and “major policy concerns” should – typically – be subjet to the scrutiny
and rigour of the public tribunal process. However, as argued above in the
context of the Dealership case (although admitedly not an administrative
case), there are many instances in which cases that are not high impact or
high profile turn out to be significant in terms of overall societal
regulation. Those cases, too, should become candidates for staying on the
public track. At the moment, my fear is that the sensibility of privatization
systematically leads these sorts of cases to the private track.
Another good potential example for thinking on this point includes
initaitves of the Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC) in the area
of monitoring and regulating settlements. The OHRC, as guided by s.
33(1) of the Human Rights Code,173 is encouraged to pursue settlements of
complaints, including through its mediation processes.174 However,
notwithstaning this strong policy preference, it retains the ability at least
partially to control the process and content of settlements. For example,
settlements reached pursuant to mediation processes that engage matters of
172

CHRC, 2006 Annual Report at 8 (Resources, Publications, Reports: “Public Interest
Litigation”), supra note 74.
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R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended. The new Human Rights Amendment Act, 2006 will
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public interest must be approved by the OHRC to ensure the interests of
the public are protected.175 Further, settlements that engage matters of
public interest may be publicized by the OHRC, even if the parties to the
mediation process do not consent.176 Finally, the OHRC specifically
discourages the use of confidentiality clauses in minutes of settlement.177
All of these are good considerations in the context of making
decisions about the use of mediation or other privatizing tools at the
tribunal level. However, my fear is that when these decisions actually get
made – i.e. whether to proceed to mediation or whether to push for the
publication of a settlement, etc. – the principle of efficiency trumps that of
public interest and justice. Although the public interest is an issue that is
obviously important to the OHRC, my concern here is hightened after
looking, for example, at the OHRC’s list of occasions in which it
considers mediation not to be appropriate, which may include:
•

•

•
•

The existence of a section 34 request that staff have
assessed as likely to result in a “not deal with”
recommendation and decision;
The complaint or the respondent[s] rejects mediation
and wishes to proceed directly to the formal process of
investigation;
Neither side is willing to consider a settlement;
One side is seeking punitive action.178

There is nothing in this list that specifically references the “public
interest”, which – in my view – should be of central concern to these sorts
of privatization considerations. Further, when it comes to publicizing
settlements, the OHRC’s stated position is that it “initiates publicity in a
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very small proportion of its cases.”179 Although not every case is a matter
of wide-spread notariety or media attention, like with many cases pursued
in court (or in arbitral proceedings, including cases like the Dealership
case), there is real value vis-à-vis societal regulation in maintaining the
public profile of the resolution of those disputes. Again, our over-riding
sensibility should be guided by principles of open justice, not private
efficiency.

C. NON-COURT OR ADMINISTRATIVE-BASED LEGISLATIVE ADR
PROCESSES
The third level of the civil dispute resolution system that needs to
ensure that justice is retained as a – and ideally the – animating sensibility
is the legislatively-sanctioned ADR regime (e.g. arbitration sanctioned by
federal or provincial arbitration legislation).180 Because of arbitration’s
very existence as a private alternative to the public system, it is on first
blush difficult to envisage overly aggressive policy changes that will lead
to dramatic increases in the level of publicity of this typically private
system. These changes will be particularly difficult to effect if arguments
such as those advanced by Gillian Hadfield181 or the Honourable Gord
Mackintosh182 primarily drive our thinking.
However, it was these sorts of arguments of privileging justice
over efficiency that guided the Ontario Government’s reform of its
Arbitration Act, 1991 to exclude the legislation’s application to family law
arbitrations that, in effect, do not comply with what Ontario deems to be in
the interests of justice (regardless of an outcome’s efficiency).183 While
the interests at stake in these reforms were particularly important
(involving rights relating to equality, religion and the family), there are
many other circumstances in which the results of an arbitral process
179

Ibid. at “Settlement”, 53.

180

Discussed supra part VII.

181

Supra note 129 and surrounding text.

182

See supra notes 119, 130 and surrounding text.

183

Discussed supra notes 143-145 and surrounding text.

64

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 04 NO. 04

should not be deferred to by a public court or sanctioned by the force of
the state’s enforcement tools and should, potentially, become part of the
public record. The Dealership case, in my view, is an example of one of
those cases. Our current preferences for the sanctity of contract and the
sanctity of the private arbitration process militate against reforms that
would preference notions of justice over notions of free market efficiency.
In my view, these current preferences risk jeopardizing the foundations of
our regulatory state.

XI. CONCLUSION
Fundamentally changing a central aspect of a democracy’s
regulatory structure, one would think, should require significant debate
and far-reaching public consultation. To-date, no such wide-ranging and
robust debate or consultation – on a fully informed basis – has
characterized the modern and wide-ranging tendency to privatize our
public systems of civil dispute resolution. On my reading of the policy
thinking and legislative history of this overall trend of privatization, while
there has been some significant discussion within the justice system
particularly concerning the merits of ADR, there is little or no awareness
at the level of the general public about the significance of these issues or
their potential concerns as they relate to the overall workings of society.
As was recognized during legislative standing committee
statements surrounding Ontario’s approach to ADR in 1990, “Because of
arbitration being a private matter, most members of the public are unaware
of the many matters that are resolved by this technique and this
mechanism.”184 This statement is still by and large true today. And while
there is at least some debate about how the common law is created and
administered in the public sphere, often through discussions framed in
support or critique of “judicial activism”,185 the public is generally
ignorant of a much more prevalent – at least in terms of our public civil
justice system (to the extent that 95-98% of cases in that system, for
184
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example, settle by some alternative process186) – trend away from an
accountable form of adjudicative governance. As I have said elsewhere:
“it never ceases to amaze me that the public, while typically up in arms
about the ‘activism’ of our public judges, is largely silent (or ignorant)
about the significant decisions made everyday by private decision-makers
behind closed-doors.”187
Fundamentally privatizing our public civil dispute resolution
systems merits significantly more public debate – and understanding –
than what has to-date occurred. Whether and how we continue actively to
privatize our tools of civil justice are questions that will have a dramatic
impact not only on how people resolve individual disputes, but also on
how we as a collective govern ourselves in our democracy. There are
clearly well documented reasons for pursuing privatization, at least in
some cases. However, the current trend of privatization – largely in the
name of cost and efficiency – is being conducted without adequate public
debate about, let alone public understanding of, all of the implications –
positive and negative – of this clear policy choice.188 We must recognize
the potential strengths of dispute resolution alternatives. However, only
through responsible, public participation in the development of these
processes will we avoid an erosion of our core democratic values
significantly embodied in a strong rule of law system, simply in the name
of speed and efficiency. We cannot treat justice simply as an externality.
Again quoting from the Chief Justice of Canada:
In this country, we realize that without justice, we have no
rights, no peace, no prosperity. We realize that, once lost,
justice is difficult to reinstate. We in Canada are the
inheritors of a good justice system, one that is the envy of
the world. Let us face our challenges squarely and thus
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ensure that our justice system remains strong and
effective.189
Ensuring that our justice system remains “strong and effective”
does not mean selling it out to the lowest bidder. Whether we are talking
about courts, tribunals or legislatively-sanctioned private arbitration panels
that enjoy the coercive enforcement powers of the state, justice – not
efficiency – must be our fundamental guide in determining how these
bodies operate and how they will be reformed going forward.
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